The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 1 of the 30 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Thousands of AI Authors on the Future of AI
Open accessAbstract
In October 2023, 2,778 researchers who had published in top-tier artificial intelligence (AI) venues gave predictions on the pace, nature and impacts of AI progress. Significant steps were taken to minimize and evaluate bias. In evaluations of participation bias, we found that most groups responded at similar rates. The participants estimated that several milestones had at least a 50% chance of being feasible for AI by 2028, including constructing a payment processing site and fine-tuning an LLM. If science continues undisrupted, the chance of unaided machines outperforming humans in every possible task was estimated at 10% by 2027 and 50% by 2047—13 years earlier than in our 2022 survey (N = 738). The chance of all occupations becoming fully automatable, however, was not expected to reach 10% until 2037, and 50% until 2116 (compared to 2164 in the 2022 survey. Most respondents expressed substantial uncertainty about long-term impacts: While 68% in 2023 thought good outcomes from high-level machine intelligence AI were more likely than bad ones, 48% of these net optimists gave at least a 5% chance of extremely bad outcomes. Conversely, 59% of net pessimists gave 5% or more to extremely good outcomes. Depending on how we asked, between 38% and 51% of respondents gave at least a 10% chance to advanced AI leading to outcomes as bad as human extinction. More than half suggested that “substantial” or “extreme” concern is warranted about AI increasing misinformation, boosting authoritarian control, worsening inequality, and other scenarios. There was broad agreement that research aimed at minimizing risks from AI systems ought to be more prioritized.
Overview
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
In the largest survey of its kind, 2,778 researchers who published at top AI venues in 2022 gave forecasts about AI progress and impacts. Aggregate forecasts put a 50% chance of high-level machine intelligence by 2047 and full automation of labor by 2116, while many respondents assigned nontrivial probability to extreme bad outcomes.
Key findings
- Aggregate forecasts gave at least a 50% chance of AI systems achieving several milestones by 2028, including autonomously constructing a payment processing site from scratch, creating a song indistinguishable from a new song by a popular musician, and autonomously downloading and fine-tuning a large language model.
- The chance of unaided machines outperforming humans in every possible task was estimated at 10% by 2027 and 50% by 2047, 13 years earlier than the 2022 survey; full automation of labor was forecast at 10% by 2037 and 50% by 2116, compared with 2164 in 2022.
- 68.3% thought good outcomes from superhuman AI are more likely than bad, but 48% of net optimists gave at least a 5% chance of extremely bad outcomes and 59% of net pessimists gave at least 5% to extremely good outcomes; between 37.8% and 51.4% gave at least a 10% chance to advanced AI leading to outcomes as bad as human extinction.
- More than half of respondents said “substantial” or “extreme” concern was warranted about six AI-related scenarios, including spread of false information, authoritarian population control, and worsened inequality; 70% thought AI safety research should be prioritized more than it currently is.
Methods
- The 2023 Expert Survey on Progress in AI was fielded in October 2023 to researchers who published in 2022 at six top AI venues: NeurIPS, ICML, ICLR, AAAI, IJCAI, and JMLR.
- From approximately 21,800 collected names, 20,066 emails were found; after 1,607 bounces, 18,459 functioning addresses yielded 2,778 responses, a 15% response rate.
- Questions used Likert scales, probability estimates, or future-year estimates; milestone questions were randomized between fixed-years and fixed-probabilities framings, and individual probability distributions were approximated by fitting gamma cumulative distribution functions.
Limitations
- The paper states that forecasting is hard even for experts, that AI researchers are not necessarily skilled forecasters, and that substantial framing effects were observed, suggesting aggregate answers to any particular question may not be an accurate guide.
- The paper states possible participation bias, though it reports no evidence of strong bias; the survey had a 15% response rate, and the 2023 sample expanded from two to six venues, which could make year-to-year comparisons less meaningful.
- The text makes evident that most questions were answered by randomized subsets rather than all 2,778 participants, and that some question wording differences, such as HLMI versus FAOL, may have produced framing effects.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
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Claims the paper makes
1 of 30 cited sources checked · 1 supported · 0 flagged
- Findingown data
Each of the eleven potentially concerning AI scenarios was considered worthy of either substantial or extreme concern by more than 30% of respondents.
“Each scenario was considered worthy of either substantial or extreme concern by more than 30% of respondents.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingcitation
The 50% FAOL estimate of 2116 is compared to 2164 in the 2022 survey.
“However, the chance of all human occupations becoming fully automatable was forecast to reach 10% by 2037, and 50% as late as 2116 (compared to 2164 in the 2022 survey).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Grace et al., 2022
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Rests on an assumption: The 2022 and 2023 surveys are comparable enough to attribute changes in forecasts to changes in opinion rather than differences in sample composition or survey administration.
- Findingown data
If science continues undisrupted, the chance of unaided machines outperforming humans in every possible task was estimated at 50% by 2047.
“If science continues undisrupted, the chance of unaided machines outperforming humans in every possible task was estimated at 10% by 2027, and 50% by 2047.”
- Also stated in: § 3.2.1 How soon will 'High-Level Machine Intelligence' be feasible? · hedged
“The aggregate 2023 forecast predicted a 50% chance of HLMI by 2047, down thirteen years from 2060 in the 2022 survey.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Also stated in: § 3.2.1 How soon will 'High-Level Machine Intelligence' be feasible? · hedged
- Findingown data
There was a wide range of views about each input, implying a large degree of uncertainty.
“There was a wide range of views about each input, implying a large degree of uncertainty.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingown data
This year's survey saw a general shift towards earlier expectations for milestones.
“While the range of views on how long it will take for milestones to be feasible can be broad, this year's survey saw a general shift towards earlier expectations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The 2022 and 2023 surveys are comparable enough to attribute changes in forecasts to changes in opinion rather than differences in sample composition or survey administration.
- Findingown data
The chance of all human occupations becoming fully automatable was forecast to reach 10% by 2037.
“However, the chance of all human occupations becoming fully automatable was forecast to reach 10% by 2037, and 50% as late as 2116 (compared to 2164 in the 2022 survey).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingown data
On average, for the 32 tasks included in both the 2022 and 2023 surveys, the 50th percentile year they were expected to become feasible shifted 1.0 years earlier (SD = 2.0, SE = 0.18).
“On average, for the 32 tasks included in both the 2022 and 2023 surveys, the 50 th percentile year they were expected to become feasible shifted 1.0 years earlier (SD = 2.0, SE = 0.18).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The 2022 and 2023 surveys are comparable enough to attribute changes in forecasts to changes in opinion rather than differences in sample composition or survey administration.
- Findingown data
One in ten participants put at least a 25% chance on outcomes in the range of human extinction.
“On the very pessimistic end, one in ten participants put at least a 25% chance on outcomes in the range of human extinction).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingown data
A large majority of respondents thought that AI safety research should be prioritized more than it currently is.
“A large majority of respondents thought that AI safety research should be prioritized more than it currently is.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingown data
The chance of all human occupations becoming fully automatable was forecast to reach 50% as late as 2116.
“However, the chance of all human occupations becoming fully automatable was forecast to reach 10% by 2037, and 50% as late as 2116 (compared to 2164 in the 2022 survey).”
- Also stated in: § 3.2.2 How soon will 'Full Automation of Labor' be feasible? · plain
“The aggregate 2023 forecast predicted a 50% chance of FAOL by 2116, down 48 years from 2164 in the 2022 survey (Figure 3).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Also stated in: § 3.2.2 How soon will 'Full Automation of Labor' be feasible? · plain
- Findingown data
Many people who have high probabilities of bad outcomes also have high probabilities of good outcomes.
“Many people who have high probabilities of bad outcomes also have high probabilities of good outcomes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingown data
A large majority of participants thought state-of-the-art AI systems in twenty years would be likely or very likely to be able to talk like a human expert on most topics (81.4% of respondents).
“Be able to talk like a human expert on most topics (81.4% of respondents)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingown data
Geographical background was correlated with expectations about the timing of human-level performance: respondents whose undergraduate education was in Asia anticipated an 11 year earlier arrival of HLMI than participants from Europe, North America, or other regions combined.
“Geographical background was correlated with expectations about the timing of human-level performance: respondents whose undergraduate education was in Asia anticipated an 11 year earlier arrival of HLMI than participants from Europe, North America, or other regions combined.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingown data
Over a third of participants (38%) put at least a 10% chance on extremely bad outcomes.
“Over a third of participants (38%) put at least a 10% chance on extremely bad outcomes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingown data
The previously-observed framing effect (fixed-years framing produces systematically later predictions) was again observed in this survey.
“The previously-observed framing effect was again observed in this survey.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Grace et al., 2018a
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Grace et al., 2022
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Findingown data
The year with a 50% chance of HLMI from participants answering in the fixed-year frame (34 years) was twice as far into the future as that for participants answering in the fixed-probability frame (17 years).
“For example, the year with a 50% chance of HLMI from participants answering in the fixed-year frame (34 years) was twice as far into the future as that for participants answering in the fixed-probability frame (17 years).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was broad agreement that research aimed at minimizing potential risks from AI systems ought to be prioritized more.
“However, there was broad agreement that research aimed at minimizing potential risks from AI systems ought to be prioritized more.”
- Also stated in: § Examples of AI safety research might include: · plain
“A large majority of respondents thought that AI safety research should be prioritized more than it currently is.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Also stated in: § Examples of AI safety research might include: · plain
- Findingown data
Between 2022 and 2023, aggregate predictions for 11 tasks moved later.
“The aggregate predictions for 11 tasks moved later.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The 2022 and 2023 surveys are comparable enough to attribute changes in forecasts to changes in opinion rather than differences in sample composition or survey administration.
- Findingown data
57.8% of participants considered extremely bad outcomes (e.g. human extinction) a nontrivial possibility (≥ 5% likely).
“57.8% considered extremely bad outcomes (e.g.human extinction) a nontrivial possibility (≥ 5% likely).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingown data
Of the net optimists, 48% gave at least a 5% chance of extremely bad outcomes such as human extinction.
“of these net optimists 48% gave at least a 5% chance of extremely bad outcomes such as human extinction”
- Also stated in: § 3.7 What will AI systems in 2043 be like? · plain
“Even among net optimists, nearly half (48.4%) gave at least 5% credence to extremely bad outcomes”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Also stated in: § 3.7 What will AI systems in 2043 be like? · plain
- Findingown data
The median probability for explosive progress 2 years after HLMI was 20% in 2016, 2022, and 2023.
“Explosive progress 2 years after HLMI 20% ( 225) 20% ( 339) 20% ( 298)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingown data
Overall, all the included inputs were seen as having contributed substantially to AI progress.
“Overall, all the included inputs were seen as having contributed substantially to AI progress.”
- Also stated in: § E Links to Data · plain
“Overall, all the included inputs were seen as having contributed substantially to AI progress.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Also stated in: § E Links to Data · plain
- Findingown data
Between 37.8% and 51.4% of respondents gave at least a 10% chance to advanced AI leading to outcomes as bad as human extinction.
“Between 37.8% and 51.4% of respondents gave at least a 10% chance to advanced AI leading to outcomes as bad as human extinction.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingown data
Between 2022 and 2023, aggregate predictions for 21 out of 32 tasks moved earlier.
“Between 2022 and 2023, aggregate predictions for 21 out of 32 tasks moved earlier.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The 2022 and 2023 surveys are comparable enough to attribute changes in forecasts to changes in opinion rather than differences in sample composition or survey administration.
- Findingown data
Depending on how asked, between 41.2% and 51.4% of respondents estimated a greater than 10% chance of human extinction or severe disempowerment.
“Depending on how we asked, between 41.2% and 51.4% of respondents estimated a greater than 10% chance of human extinction or severe disempowerment (see Figure 13).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingown data
A majority spread their credence across the entire spectrum of outcomes, with 64% assigning non-zero probabilities to both extremely good and extremely bad scenarios.
“A majority spread their credence across the entire spectrum of outcomes, with 64% assigning non-zero probabilities to both extremely good and extremely bad scenarios.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingown data
The median probability for explosive progress 30 years after HLMI was 80% in 2016, 2022, and 2023.
“Explosive progress 30 years after HLMI 80% ( 225) 80% ( 339) 80% ( 297)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingown data
All 11 traits were considered to have a relatively high chance of existing in AI systems in 2043, though with much uncertainty.
“All 11 traits were considered to have a relatively high chance of existing in AI systems in 2043, though with much uncertainty.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingown data
There was disagreement about whether faster or slower AI progress would be better for the future of humanity.
“There was disagreement about whether faster or slower AI progress would be better for the future of humanity.”
- Also stated in: § 4.5 What rate of AI progress would produce the most optimism? · plain
“There was disagreement on whether faster or slower progress would be preferable, though large divergence from the current speed was less popular (Table 3).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Also stated in: § 4.5 What rate of AI progress would produce the most optimism? · plain
- Findingown data
All but four of the 39 tasks were predicted to have at least a 50% chance of being feasible within the next ten years.
“All but four of the 39 tasks were predicted to have at least a 50% chance of being feasible within the next ten years (Figure 1).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingown data
Since 2022, mean overall probability on extreme outcomes (good or bad) has fallen slightly.
“Since 2022, mean overall probability on extreme outcomes (good or bad) has fallen slightly (Figure 11).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Grace et al., 2022
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Rests on an assumption: The 2022 and 2023 surveys are comparable enough to attribute changes in forecasts to changes in opinion rather than differences in sample composition or survey administration.
- Findingown data
There is about a 70-year difference between the mean 50% prediction for HLMI and the mean 50% prediction for FAOL.
“There is about a 70-year difference between the mean 50% prediction for HLMI and the mean 50% prediction for FAOL.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The gap between HLMI and FAOL predictions was seen in the results from the surveys of 2023, 2022, and 2016.
“This was seen in the results from the surveys of 2023, 2022, and 2016.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Grace et al., 2018a
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Grace et al., 2022
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Findingown data
A large majority of participants thought state-of-the-art AI systems in twenty years would be likely or very likely to find unexpected ways to achieve goals (82.3% of respondents).
“Find unexpected ways to achieve goals (82.3% of respondents)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingcitation
In the six years between the 2016 and 2022 surveys, the expected date for HLMI moved only one year earlier, from 2061 to 2060.
“For comparison, in the six years between the 2016 and 2022 surveys, the expected date moved only one year earlier, from 2061 to 2060foot_0 .”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Grace et al., 2018a
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Grace et al., 2022
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Rests on an assumption: The 2022 and 2023 surveys are comparable enough to attribute changes in forecasts to changes in opinion rather than differences in sample composition or survey administration.
- Findingown data
If science continues undisrupted, the chance of unaided machines outperforming humans in every possible task was estimated at 10% by 2027.
“If science continues undisrupted, the chance of unaided machines outperforming humans in every possible task was estimated at 10% by 2027, and 50% by 2047.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingown data
Across these same questions, between 38% and 51% placed at least 10% chance on advanced AI bringing extinction-level outcomes.
“Across these same questions, between 38% and 51% placed at least 10% chance on advanced AI bringing these extinction-level outcomes (see Figure 13).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingcitation
The 50% by 2047 estimate is 13 years earlier than that reached in a similar survey conducted one year earlier.
“The latter estimate is 13 years earlier than that reached in a similar survey we conducted only one year earlier [Grace et al., 2022].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Grace et al., 2022
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Rests on an assumption: The 2022 and 2023 surveys are comparable enough to attribute changes in forecasts to changes in opinion rather than differences in sample composition or survey administration.
- Findingown data
68.3% of respondents thought good outcomes from superhuman AI are more likely than bad.
“While 68.3% thought good outcomes from superhuman AI are more likely than bad”
- Also stated in: § 3.7 What will AI systems in 2043 be like? · plain
“68.3% of participants found good outcomes more likely than bad outcomes”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Also stated in: § 3.7 What will AI systems in 2043 be like? · plain
- Findingown data
Predictions for a 50% chance of the arrival of FAOL are consistently more than sixty years later than those for a 50% chance of the arrival of HLMI.
“Predictions for a 50% chance of the arrival of FAOL are consistently more than sixty years later than those for a 50% chance of the arrival of HLMI.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Most respondents expressed substantial uncertainty about the long-term value of AI progress.
“Most respondents expressed substantial uncertainty about the long-term value of AI progress:”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingown data
The median probability that AI is vastly better than humans 2 years after HLMI was 10% in 2016, 2022, and 2023.
“AI is vastly better than humans 2 years after HLMI 10% (213) 10% ( 371) 10% ( 281)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingown data
A large majority of participants thought state-of-the-art AI systems in twenty years would be likely or very likely to frequently behave in ways that are surprising to humans (69.1% of respondents).
“Frequently behave in ways that are surprising to humans (69.1% of respondents)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingown data
59% of net pessimists gave 5% or more to extremely good outcomes.
“and 59% of net pessimists gave 5% or more to extremely good outcomes.”
- Also stated in: § 3.7 What will AI systems in 2043 be like? · plain
“and among net pessimists, more than half (58.6%) gave at least 5% to extremely good outcomes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Also stated in: § 3.7 What will AI systems in 2043 be like? · plain
- Findingown data
The paper observed substantial framing effects.
“Another piece of evidence against the accuracy of forecasts is the observation of substantial framing effects (See Sections 3.2 and 3.3).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The median prediction for extremely bad outcomes, such as human extinction, was 5% (mean 9%).
“The median prediction for extremely bad outcomes, such as human extinction, was 5% (mean 9%).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Findingown data
Respondents whose undergraduate education was in Asia anticipated an 11 year earlier arrival of High-Level Machine Intelligence (HLMI) than participants from Europe, North America, or other regions combined.
“Additionally, respondents whose undergraduate education was in Asia anticipated an 11 year earlier arrival of High-Level Machine Intelligence (HLMI) than participants from Europe, North America, or other regions combined.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The majority of respondents said that the alignment problem is either a very important problem (41%) or among the most important problems in the field (13%).
“The majority of respondents said that the alignment problem is either a”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
For each of the two questions asked in both 2022 and 2023 about the probability that AI causes human extinction, respondents' estimates were very similar.
“For each of the two questions that were asked in both years, the results are very similar.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Aggregate forecasts for HLMI in 2023 have gotten earlier since 2022.
“Aggregate forecasts for HLMI and FAOL in 2023 have gotten earlier since 2022.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Aggregate forecasts for time until HLMI were shorter for participants whose region of undergraduate study was Asia.
“Figure 17: Aggregate forecasts for time until HLMI were shorter for participants whose region of undergraduate study was Asia.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Participants who received questions framed in terms of fixed-years had later forecasts than those who received questions in terms of fixed-probabilities.
“Figure 18: Participants who received questions framed in terms of fixed-years had later forecasts than those who received questions in terms of fixed-probabilities.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The most substantial difference between responders and non-responders was that those who worked in industry were 61% as likely to respond as the base rate.
“The most substantial difference between the groups was that those who worked in industry were 61% as likely to respond as the base rate.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The 2023 aggregate forecast for the year with a 10% chance of FAOL is 2037.
“Year with a 10% chance of FAOL 2036 (n*=97) 2050 (n=202) 2037 (n=774)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Respondents exhibited diverse views on the expected goodness/badness of High Level Machine Intelligence (HLMI).
“Respondents exhibited diverse views on the expected goodness/badness of High Level Machine Intelligence (HLMI).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
70% of respondents thought AI safety research should be prioritized more than it currently is.
“Figure 14: 70% of respondents thought AI safety research should be prioritized more than it currently is.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Women were 66% as likely to respond as the base rate.
“Women were 66% as likely to respond as the base rate, though were a relatively small portion of respondents or non-respondents overall (around one in ten), which limits how much this could affect the aggregate results.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Over a third of participants (38%) put at least a 10% chance on extremely bad outcomes (e.g. human extinction).
“Over a third of participants (38%) put at least a 10% chance on extremely bad outcomes (e.g.human extinction).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Aggregate forecast for 50th percentile arrival time of High-Level Machine intelligence (HLMI) dropped by 13 years between 2022 and 2023.
“Aggregate forecast for 50 th percentile arrival time of High-Level Machine intelligence (HLMI) dropped by 13 years between 2022 and 2023.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
People in Asia were 84% as likely as the base rate to respond.
“Those with at least 1,000 citations were 69% as likely to respond as the base rate, and people in Asia were 84% as likely as the base rate to respond.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The survey was taken by 15% of those we contacted.
“The survey was taken by 15% of those we contacted.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The forecast for 50th percentile arrival time of Full Automation of Labor (FAOL) dropped by 48 years in the same period.
“The forecast for 50 th percentile arrival time of Full Automation of Labor (FAOL) dropped by 48 years in the same period.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The majority of respondents said that the alignment problem is harder (36%) or much harder (21%) than other problems in AI.
“and the majority said the it is”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Citation count did not have a significant effect on forecasts for time until HLMI.
“Citation count did not have a significant effect on forecasts for time until HLMI.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Time in field did not have a significant effect on forecasts for time until HLMI.
“Time in field did not have a significant effect on forecasts for time until HLMI.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The paid pilot survey group had substantially higher response rates.
“Because the paid pilot survey group had substantially higher response rates, we decided to offer the reward to all participants (including those who had been in the unpaid group).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The 2023 aggregate forecast for the year with a 50% chance of HLMI is 2047.
“Year with a 50% chance of HLMI 2061 (n*=259) 2060 (n=461) 2047 (n=1714)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The 2023 aggregate forecast for the year with a 50% chance of FAOL is 2116.
“Year with a 50% chance of FAOL 2138 (n*=97) 2164 (n=202) 2116 (n=774)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Those with at least 1,000 citations were 69% as likely to respond as the base rate.
“Those with at least 1,000 citations were 69% as likely to respond as the base rate, and people in Asia were 84% as likely as the base rate to respond.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The 2023 aggregate forecast for the year with a 10% chance of HLMI is 2027.
“Year with a 10% chance of HLMI 2025 (n*=259) 2029 (n=461) 2027 (n=1714)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Expected feasibility of many AI milestones moved substantially earlier in the course of one year (between 2022 and 2023).
“Expected feasibility of many AI milestones moved substantially earlier in the course of one year (between 2022 and 2023).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Aggregate forecasts for FAOL in 2023 have gotten earlier since 2022.
“Aggregate forecasts for HLMI and FAOL in 2023 have gotten earlier since 2022.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Respondents did not generally think that it is more valuable to work on the alignment problem today than other problems.
“However, respondents did not generally think that it is more valuable to work on the alignment problem today than other problems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Most respondents indicated that the pace of progress in their area of AI increased between the first and second half of their time in a field.
“Most respondents indicated that the pace of progress in their area of AI increased between the first and second half of their time in a field.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Study design and conductown data
This survey constitutes the largest survey of AI researchers to date.
“This to our knowledge constitutes the largest survey of AI researchers to date.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
The relatively even distribution of predictions cuts against a common narrative that progress in cheap computing is the dominant driver of AI progress.
“Additionally, the relatively even distribution of predictions cuts against a common narrative that progress in cheap computing is the dominant driver of AI progress.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
The broad variance in credence in catastrophic scenarios shows there isn't strong evidence understood by all experts that this kind of outcome is certain or implausible.
“The broad variance in credence in catastrophic scenarios shows there isn't strong evidence understood by all experts that this kind of outcome is certain or implausible.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
If seemingly unimportant changes in question framing lead to large changes in responses, this suggests that even aggregate answers to any particular question are not an accurate guide to the answer.
“If seemingly unimportant changes in question framing lead to large changes in responses, this suggests that even aggregate answers to any particular question are not an accurate guide to the answer.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
There are signs in this research and past surveys that these experts are not accurate forecasters across the range of questions we ask.
“There are signs in this research and past surveys that these experts are not accurate forecasters across the range of questions we ask.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The survey participants do not have any unusual skill at forecasting in general.
- Study design and conductown data
The 2023 Expert Survey on Progress in AI surveyed 2,778 AI researchers who had published peer-reviewed research in the prior year in six top AI venues (NeurIPS, ICML, ICLR, AAAI, IJCAI, JMLR).
“we surveyed 2,778 researchers who had published in top-tier artificial intelligence (AI) venues”
- Also stated in: § 1 Introduction · plain
“We conducted a survey of 2,778 AI researchers who had published peer-reviewed research in the prior year in six top AI venues (NeurIPS, ICML, ICLR, AAAI, IJCAI, JMLR).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 1 Introduction · plain
- Premisecitation
There is a lack of apparent consensus among AI experts on the future of AI.
“However, there is a lack of apparent consensus among AI experts on the future of AI [Korzekwa and Stewart, 2023].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Korzekwa and Stewart, 2023
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Study design and conductown data
The difference in FAOL predictions between 2022 and 2023 was significant for participants who received the question in the fixed-probabilities framing (p = .0052, Yuen's test).
“We checked if this difference was significant for participants who received the question in the fixedprobabilities framing, and found that it was (p = .0052,Yuen's test (bootstrap version); see Appendix F).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Study design and conductown data
Each question in this survey was answered by on average 96% of those who saw it, excluding demographics questions, free response questions, and questions asking for a response conditionally.
“However each question in this survey was answered by on average 96% of those who saw it, excluding demographics questions, free response questions, and questions asking for a response conditionally.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Study design and conductnone given
The paper finds no evidence suggesting strong participation bias.
“We find no evidence suggesting strong participation bias.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Based on an analysis by Hamilton [2003], the median response rate across 199 surveys was 26%.
“Based on an analysis by Hamilton [2003], the median response rate across 199 surveys was 26%, and larger invitation lists tend to yield lower response rates: surveys sent to over 20,000 people, like ours, are expected to have a response rate in the range of 10%.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hamilton [2003]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Study design and conductown data
Where checked, the subset of 2023 participants who published in NeurIPS or ICML specifically appeared to have very similar opinions to the full sample.
“However where we checked, the subset of 2023 participants who published in NeurIPS or ICML specifically appeared to have very similar opinions to the full sample.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Study design and conductnone given
The analysis was insensitive to the value of the upper bound of 100,000,000 years.
“Our analysis was insensitive to the value of this upper bound.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Surveys sent to over 20,000 people are expected to have a response rate in the range of 10%.
“Based on an analysis by Hamilton [2003], the median response rate across 199 surveys was 26%, and larger invitation lists tend to yield lower response rates: surveys sent to over 20,000 people, like ours, are expected to have a response rate in the range of 10%.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hamilton [2003]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
Larger invitation lists tend to yield lower response rates.
“Based on an analysis by Hamilton [2003], the median response rate across 199 surveys was 26%, and larger invitation lists tend to yield lower response rates: surveys sent to over 20,000 people, like ours, are expected to have a response rate in the range of 10%.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hamilton [2003]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
In specialized samples, such as scientists, lower response rates are common due to sampling challenges.
“In specialized samples, such as scientists, lower response rates are common due to sampling challenges, as exemplified by on Assessing Fundamental Attitudes of Life Scientists as a Basis for Biosecurity Education [2009], which achieved a 15.7% response rate in a survey of life scientists.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites on Assessing Fundamental Attitudes of Life Scientists as a Basis for Biosecurity Education [2009]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationcitation
This response rate appears to be within the typical range for a large expert survey.
“This appears to be within the typical range for a large expert survey.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hamilton [2003]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
The similarity of answers across several slightly different questions, across this and previous surveys, and across participants in academia and industry and different geographic regions appears to be robust evidence that the majority of AI researchers think there is a nontrivial risk of extinction or similar catastrophes due to AI.
“The similarity of answers across several slightly different questions, across this and previous surveys, and across participants in academia and industry and different geographic regions appears to be robust evidence that the majority of AI researchers think there is a nontrivial risk of extinction or similar catastrophes due to AI.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
This would seem to rule out the possibility that a large proportion of respondents were people for whom the future of AI is an ideological issue.
“This would seem to rule out the possibility that a large proportion of respondents were people for whom the future of AI is an ideological issue.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
The scope for question-level participation bias in opinion questions reported on in this paper is very small.
“So the scope for question-level participation bias in opinion questions reported on in this paper is very small.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
- It may state two separate claims as one. 39
- Probably not a substantial claim. 23
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
It may state two separate claims as one.
PremisecitationForecasting is difficult in general, and subject-matter experts have been observed to perform poorly.
“Forecasting is difficult in general, and subject-matter experts have been observed to perform poorly [Tetlock, 2005, Savage et al., 2021].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Tetlock, 2005
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Savage et al., 2021 source
It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataThe median probability that AI is vastly better than humans 30 years after HLMI was 50% in 2016 and 60% in 2022 and 2023.
“AI is vastly better than humans 30 years after HLMI 50% (214) 60% ( 371) 60% ( 282)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataAs in 2022, a majority of participants considered AI to pose at least a 5% chance of causing human extinction or similarly permanent and severe disempowerment of the human species, and this result was consistent across four different questions, two assigned to each participant.
“As in 2022, a majority of participants considered AI to pose at least a 5% chance of causing human extinction or similarly permanent and severe disempowerment of the human species, and this result was consistent across four different questions, two assigned to each participant.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Grace et al., 2022
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Rests on an assumption: The 2022 and 2023 surveys are comparable enough to attribute changes in forecasts to changes in opinion rather than differences in sample composition or survey administration.
It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataThe proportion of people who put at least a 10% chance on extremely bad outcomes (e.g. human extinction) has fallen from 48% in 2022 to 2023, and the mean prediction for this type of outcome is down from 14% to 9.0%.
“The proportion of people who put at least a 10% chance on extremely bad outcomes (e.g.human extinction) has fallen from 48% in 2022 in 2023, and the mean prediction for this type of outcome is down from 14% to 9.0%.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Grace et al., 2022
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Rests on an assumption: The 2022 and 2023 surveys are comparable enough to attribute changes in forecasts to changes in opinion rather than differences in sample composition or survey administration.
It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataThere was disagreement on whether faster or slower progress would be preferable, though large divergence from the current speed was less popular.
“There was disagreement on whether faster or slower progress would be preferable, though large divergence from the current speed was less popular (Table 3).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataMost respondents considered it unlikely that users of AI systems in 2028 will be able to know the true reasons for the AI systems' choices, with only 20% giving it better than even odds.
“Most respondents considered it unlikely that users of AI systems in 2028 will be able to know the true reasons for the AI systems' choices, with only 20% giving it better than even odds.(n=912)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataCompared to 2016, 2023 has earlier 50% estimates but later 10% estimates for FAOL.
“Compared to 2016, 2023 has earlier 50% estimates but later 10% estimates.(See Appendix B)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Grace et al., 2018a
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Rests on an assumption: The 2022 and 2023 surveys are comparable enough to attribute changes in forecasts to changes in opinion rather than differences in sample composition or survey administration.
It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataParticipants estimated that halving the drop in costs of computing would have had the greatest effect on AI progress over the last decade, while halving 'researcher effort' and 'progress in AI algorithms' would have had the least effect.
“Participants estimated that halving the drop in costs of computing would have had the greatest effect on AI progress over the last decade, while halving 'researcher effort' and 'progress in AI algorithms' would have had the least effect.”
- Also stated in: § E Links to Data · hedged
“Participants estimated that halving the drop in costs of computing would have had the greatest effect on AI progress over the last decade, while halving 'researcher effort' and 'progress in AI algorithms' would have had the least effect.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
- Also stated in: § E Links to Data · hedged
It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataThe 38% figure is comparable to, but somewhat lower than, rates of assigning at least 10% to extinction-level outcomes in answers to other questions more directly about extinction, between 41% and 51%.
“This is comparable to, but somewhat lower than, rates of assigning at least 10% to extinction-level outcomes in answers to other questions more directly about extinction, between 41% and 51% (see Section 4.3).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataAnswers to the three similar questions about human extinction were mostly consistent, with medians of 5% or 10%.
“Answers to these questions were mostly consistent, with medians of 5% or 10%.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataEven the larger of the two framing estimates (34 years) is shorter than 2022's combined forecast (37 years), demonstrating a substantial shift of predictions closer to the present.
“However, it's notable that even the larger of these two is shorter than 2022's combined forecast (37 years), demonstrating a substantial shift of predictions closer to the present (Fig 18 in Appendix B).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Grace et al., 2022
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Rests on an assumption: The 2022 and 2023 surveys are comparable enough to attribute changes in forecasts to changes in opinion rather than differences in sample composition or survey administration.
It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataThe scenarios worthy of most concern, as measured by percentage of respondents who thought a scenario constituted either a 'substantial' or 'extreme' concern, were: spread of false information e.g. deepfakes (86%), manipulation of large-scale public opinion trends (79%), AI letting dangerous groups make powerful tools (e.g. engineered viruses) (73%), authoritarian rulers using AI to control their
“the scenarios worthy of most concern were: spread of false information e.g.deepfakes (86%), manipulation of large-scale public opinion trends (79%), AI letting dangerous groups make powerful tools (e.g.engineered viruses) (73%), authoritarian rulers using AI to control their populations (73%), and AI systems worsening economic inequality by disproportionately benefiting certain individuals (71%).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataRespondents exhibited diverse views on the future impact of advanced AI, highlighting how respondents' views are more complex than can be represented by an 'optimism vs pessimism' axis.
“Respondents exhibited diverse views on the future impact of advanced AI (Figure 10), highlighting how respondents' views are more complex than can be represented by an 'optimism vs pessimism' axis.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataParticipants who had thought more in the past about AI risks seem to give higher numbers, suggesting they are unlikely to give radically lower numbers with further examples of risks.
“Participants who had thought more in the past about AI risks seem to give higher numbers, suggesting they are unlikely to give radically lower numbers with further examples of risks (see Table 4).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
FindingcitationThe aggregate 2023 forecast predicted a 10% chance of HLMI by 2027, down two years from 2029 in the 2022 survey.
“The aggregate 2023 forecast predicted a 10% chance of HLMI by 2027, down two years from 2029 in the 2022 survey.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Grace et al., 2022
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Rests on an assumption: The 2022 and 2023 surveys are comparable enough to attribute changes in forecasts to changes in opinion rather than differences in sample composition or survey administration.
It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataIn general, there were a wide range of views about expected social consequences of advanced AI, and most people put some weight on both extremely good outcomes and extremely bad outcomes.
“In general, there were a wide range of views about expected social consequences of advanced AI, and most people put some weight on both extremely good outcomes and extremely bad outcomes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
FindingreasoningOn many questions different respondents give very different answers, which limits the number of them who can be close to the truth.
“For one thing, on many questions different respondents give very different answers, which limits the number of them who can be close to the truth.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataParticipants expressed a wide range of views on almost every question: some of the biggest areas of consensus are on how wide-open possibilities for the future appear to be.
“Participants expressed a wide range of views on almost every question: some of the biggest areas of consensus are on how wide-open possibilities for the future appear to be.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataOver the fourteen months since the last survey, a similar participant pool expected human-level performance 13 to 48 years sooner on average (depending on how the question was phrased), and 21 out of 32 shorter term milestones are now expected earlier.
“Over the fourteen months since the last survey [Grace et al., 2022], a similar participant pool expected human-level performance 13 to 48 years sooner on average (depending on how the question was phrased), and 21 out of 32 shorter term milestones are now expected earlier.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Grace et al., 2022
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Rests on an assumption: The 2022 and 2023 surveys are comparable enough to attribute changes in forecasts to changes in opinion rather than differences in sample composition or survey administration.
It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataThe percentage of researchers who thought AI safety research should be prioritized more increased compared to earlier surveys, but only slightly since 2022.
“The percentage of researchers who thought so increased compared to earlier surveys, but only slightly since 2022.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Grace et al., 2022
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Rests on an assumption: The 2022 and 2023 surveys are comparable enough to attribute changes in forecasts to changes in opinion rather than differences in sample composition or survey administration.
It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataThe aggregate forecasts give at least a 50% chance of AI systems achieving several milestones by 2028, including autonomously constructing a payment processing site from scratch, creating a song indistinguishable from a new song by a popular musician, and autonomously downloading and fine-tuning a large language model.
“The aggregate forecasts give at least a 50% chance of AI systems achieving several milestones by 2028, including autonomously constructing a payment processing site from scratch, creating a song indistinguishable from a new song by a popular musician, and autonomously downloading and fine-tuning a large language model.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataThe aggregate 2023 forecast predicted a 50% chance of FAOL by 2116, down 48 years from 2164 in the 2022 survey.
“The aggregate 2023 forecast predicted a 50% chance of FAOL by 2116, down 48 years from 2164 in the 2022 survey (Figure 3).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Grace et al., 2022
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Rests on an assumption: The 2022 and 2023 surveys are comparable enough to attribute changes in forecasts to changes in opinion rather than differences in sample composition or survey administration.
It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataIn the first framing, the median prediction for 2 years post-HLMI was 20%, whereas the median prediction for 30 years post-HLMI was 80%.
“In the first framing, the median prediction for 2 years post-HLMI was 20%, whereas the median prediction for 30 years post-HLMI was 80%.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Findingown data95% of these responses were deemed 'finished' by Qualtrics.
“95% of these responses were deemed 'finished' by Qualtrics.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Findingnone givenSmall code changes and improvements to data cleaning between the 2022 and 2023 surveys shifted the aggregate slightly.
“small code changes and improvements to data cleaning between surveys shifted the aggregate slightly.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Findingnone givenThere is still a lot of uncertainty.
“However, there is still a lot of uncertainty.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataIn the second framing, the median prediction for 2 years post-HLMI was 10%, whereas the median prediction for 30 years post-HLMI was 60%.
“In the second framing, the median prediction for 2 years post-HLMI was 10%, whereas the median prediction for 30 years post-HLMI was 60%.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataIn total, 196 participants gave answers with decreasing probabilities, and 7 of these users gave answers summing to 100% for fixed time questions.
“In total, 196 participants gave answers with decreasing probabilities, and 7 of these users gave answers summing to 100% for fixed time questions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataOut of the 20,066 emails contacted, 1,607 (8%) bounced or failed, leaving 18,459 functioning email addresses.
“Out of the 20,066 emails we contacted, 1,607 (8%) bounced or failed, leaving 18,459 functioning email addresses.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataThe authors received 2,778 responses, for a response rate of 15%.
“We received 2,778 responses, for a response rate of 15%.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataWhether participants worked in academia or industry did not affect median responses much-both had a median of 5%.
“Whether participants worked in academia or industry did not affect median responses much-both had a median of 5%.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimThe quote only partly states this claim.
Findingown dataDevelopments since the 2022 survey have not substantially changed the proportion of participants who think AI safety should be prioritized more or much more.
“Developments since the 2022 survey have not substantially changed the proportion of participants who think AI safety should be prioritized”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataThe region respondents graduated from affected responses somewhat: the Asian median was 10%, while North American and European medians were 5%.
“The region respondents graduated from affected responses somewhat: the Asian median was 10%, while North American and European medians were 5%.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataPeople who had thought more about the social impacts of smarter-than-human machines were substantially less likely to give more than 10% credence to extremely optimistic outcomes, and substantially more likely to give extremely negative outcomes more than 10% credence.
“People who had thought more about the social impacts of smarter-than-human machines were substantially less likely to give more than than 10% credence to extremely optimistic outcomes, and substantially more likely to give extremely negative outcomes more than 10% credence.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Findingown dataThe question which was skipped the least often was about the long-term value of HLMI, answered by 100% of those who saw it.
“The question which was skipped the least often was about the long-term value of HLMI (see Section 4.2), answered by 100% of those who saw it, probably because it was not possible to skip and continue the survey.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
InterpretationreasoningAchieving HLMI seems to either imply having already achieved FAOL, or suggest being close.
“Since occupations might naturally be understood either as complex tasks, composed of tasks, or closely connected with one of these, achieving HLMI seems to either imply having already achieved FAOL, or suggest being close.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
Study design and conductown dataA Welch t-test found that the difference between the two framings of the AI safety research prioritization question was not significant (t(1327) = -0.58, p = 0.564, d = -0.03), so the results were combined (n=1329).
“A Welch t-test found that the difference between the two framings was not significant (t(1327) = -0.58,p = 0.564, d = -0.03),so the results were combined (n=1329).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
InterpretationreasoningInsofar as HLMI and FAOL refer to the same event, the difference in predictions about the time of their arrival would seem to be a framing effect.
“Insofar as HLMI and FAOL refer to the same event, the difference in predictions about the time of their arrival would seem to be a framing effect.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
PremisecitationIn a closely related study, Karger et al. [2023] found college graduates gave answers nearly six orders of magnitude apart when asked in different ways to estimate the size of existential risks from AI; when given example odds of low-probability events, estimates were much lower.
“In an extreme example in a closely related study, Karger et al. [2023] found college graduates gave answers nearly six orders of magnitude apart when asked in different ways to estimate the size of existential risks from AI: When given example odds of low-probability events, estimates were much lower.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Karger et al. [2023]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
PremisecitationIn other contexts, averages from a large set of noisy predictions can still be relatively accurate.
“Nonetheless, in other contexts, averages from a large set of noisy predictions can still be relatively accurate [Surowiecki, 2004], so a question remains as to how informative these aggregate forecasts are.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Surowiecki, 2004
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Interpretationown dataThis may reflect a view amongst AI researchers that the general public misunderstands AI.
“This may reflect a view amongst AI researchers that the general public misunderstands AI.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
Interpretationown dataIn sum, across the three intelligence explosion questions, the median participant did not overall expect something like a rapid acceleration of progress from an 'intelligence explosion,' but did give substantial credence to it.
“In sum, across these three questions, the median participant did not overall expect something like a rapid acceleration of progress from an 'intelligence explosion,' but did give substantial credence to it.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. It may state two separate claims as one.
InterpretationreasoningAI experts' predictions should not be seen as a reliable guide to objective truth, but can provide one important piece of the puzzle.
“While AI experts' predictions should not be seen as a reliable guide to objective truth, they can provide one important piece of the puzzle.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
Study design and conductnone givenThe HLMI-framing used 40 years instead of 50 years to keep the survey consistent with previous surveys, where this discrepancy was introduced by mistake.
“The HLMI-framing used 40 years instead of 50 years.This was done to keep the survey consistent with the previous surveys, where this discrepancy was introduced by mistake.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Study design and conductcitationThe survey and its analysis were preregistered.
“The survey and its analysis were preregistered [Sandkühler et al., 2023].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Sandkühler et al., 2023
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
It may state two separate claims as one.
Study design and conductown dataThe paper looked for evidence of response bias at the survey level and question level for some questions, and did not find any that would affect the results to a large extent.
“We looked for evidence of response bias at the survey level and question level for some questions, and did not find any that would affect the results to a large extent (see Appendix D for more detail).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Study design and conductnone givenThe survey and its implementation were approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Bonn (248/23-EP).
“The survey and its implementation were approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Bonn (248/23-EP).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Study design and conductcitationAs in previous surveys, most questions were randomly assigned to only a subset of participants, in order to keep the number of questions for each participant low.
“As in Grace et al. [2018a] and Grace et al. [2022], most questions were randomly assigned to only a subset of participants, in order to keep the number of questions for each participant low.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
InterpretationreasoningAI researchers' familiarity with the relevant technology, and experience with the dynamics of its progress, make them among the best-positioned to make informative educated guesses.
“However, AI researchers' familiarity with the relevant technology, and experience with the dynamics of its progress, make them among the best-positioned to make informative educated guesses.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The survey participants do not have any unusual skill at forecasting in general.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Study design and conductnone givenWhile designing new questions, the authors tested them in a series of interviews with AI researchers and students.
“While designing new questions, we tested them in a series of interviews with AI researchers and students.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Study design and conductnone givenAny individual respondent did not see more than one of these questions.
“Any individual respondent did not see more than one of these questions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Study design and conductcitationMost questions were identical to those asked previously in surveys conducted in 2016 and 2022.
“Most questions were identical to those asked previously in surveys conducted in 2016 [Grace et al., 2018a] and 2022 [Grace et al., 2022].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Grace et al., 2018a
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Grace et al., 2022
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. It may state two separate claims as one.
InterpretationreasoningWhile unreliable, educated guesses are what we must all rely on, and AI researchers' guesses are informed by expertise in the relevant field.
“While unreliable, educated guesses are what we must all rely on, and theirs are informed by expertise in the relevant field.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The survey participants do not have any unusual skill at forecasting in general.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Study design and conductown dataThe number of people who answered each of the eleven questions was between 649 and 667.
“i.e. the number of people (n) who answered each of these eleven questions was between 649 and 667”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
Study design and conductown dataFor each of two questions, the authors added a new version with modified phrasing and randomly assigned participants either the version of the question asked in Grace et al. [2022] or the new version.
“For each of two questions, we added a new version with modified phrasing and randomly assigned participants either the version of the question asked in Grace et al. [2022] or the new version.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
InterpretationreasoningDespite these limitations, AI researchers are well-positioned to contribute to the accuracy of our collective guesses about the future.
“Despite these limitations, AI researchers are well-positioned to contribute to the accuracy of our collective guesses about the future.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The survey participants do not have any unusual skill at forecasting in general.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Study design and conductreasoningBecause participants received randomized subsets of the questions, the number of responses is far less than 2,778 for most individual questions.
“Because participants received randomized subsets of the questions, the number of responses is far less than 2,778 for most individual questions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
The surveyed AI researchers are representative of AI researchers as a whole.
“We conducted a survey of 2,778 AI researchers who had published peer-reviewed research in the prior year in six top AI venues (NeurIPS, ICML, ICLR, AAAI, IJCAI, JMLR).”
The paper relies on this without support.
The 2022 and 2023 surveys are comparable enough to attribute changes in forecasts to changes in opinion rather than differences in sample composition or survey administration.
“The 2023 survey included around four times as many participants as the 2022 survey by expanding from two publication venues (NeurIPS and ICML) to six.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The survey participants do not have any unusual skill at forecasting in general.
“Our participants' expertise is in AI, and they do not, to our knowledge, have any unusual skill at forecasting in general.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
HLMI will at some point exist.
“Assume for the purpose of this question that HLMI will at some point exist.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Thinking more about a topic improves predictions about it.
“while thinking more about a topic presumably improves predictions about it”
Statistics recomputed
Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.
- Consistentt(1327) = -0.58reported p = .564 · recomputed p = .562
“t(1327) = -0.58,p = .564”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Conflicting time horizon for the AI-performance question
MinorThe prose says this question asks about 2 and 20 years after HLMI, while Table 1 reports results for 2 and 30 years after HLMI.
“AI that can outperform humans across all professions 2 and 20 years post-HLMI.”
“AI is vastly better than humans 30 years after HLMI 50% (214) 60% ( 371) 60% ( 282)”
Year-valued responses attributed to the wrong framing
MinorThe text says respondents entered calendar years in fixed-probabilities questions, but then says the correction was applied to fixed-years answers. Under the paper's definitions, fixed-years answers are probabilities, not years.
“Some participants gave answers to fixed-probabilities questions which identified a particular year, rather than a number of years in the future.For example, 2033 instead of 10.To address this, we subtracted 2023 from answers to fixed-years questions greater than 2000 and less than 3000.”
“In the "fixed-years framing," we asked respondents how likely they thought it was that each AI task would be feasible within the next 10 years, 20 years and 50 years (or 40 yearsfoot_6 ).”
Conflicting counts of tasks forecast to take over ten years
MinorThe text first says only four of the 39 tasks fall outside the ten-year window, then identifies six tasks expected to take longer than ten years.
“All but four of the 39 tasks were predicted to have at least a 50% chance of being feasible within the next ten years (Figure 1).”
“The six tasks expected to take longer than ten years were:”
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Grow Your Artificial Intelligence Competence
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Dissociating Artificial Intelligence from Artificial Consciousness
Findlay, G., Marshall, W., Albantakis, L., David, I., Mayner, W. G., Koch, C., & Tononi, G. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2412.04571 · Cited by 41
“…that artificial general intelligence is within reach, leading to systems that perform at least as well as humans in most and, eventually, in all cognitive domains [7]. a r i Such prospects raise the following question: would machines with human-like intelligence also have human-like consciousness?”
O futuro da pesquisa em inteligência artificial
Costa, A. H. R., & Cozman, F. G. (2024) · Revista USP · doi:10.11606/issn.2316-9036.i141p133-146 · Cited by 6
Liability and Insurance for Catastrophic Losses: the Nuclear Power Precedent and Lessons for AIPreprint
Trout, C. (2024) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2409.06673 · Cited by 6
Position: Scaling LLM Agents Requires Asymptotic Analysis with LLM PrimitivesPreprint
Meyerson, E., & Qiu, X. (2025) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2502.04358 · Cited by 6
Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Risks in Occupational Safety and Health
Baraza, X., & Torrent‐Sellens, J. (2026) · Encyclopedia · doi:10.3390/encyclopedia6010025 · Cited by 6
Harvard Undergraduate Survey on Generative AI
Hirabayashi, S., Jain, R., Jurković, N., & Wu, G. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2406.00833 · Cited by 5
“1 A recent survey of thousands of AI experts estimated that there is a 50% chance of AI outperforming humans in every possible task by 2047 [7].”
BackgroundSubjective Experience in AI Systems: What Do AI Researchers and the Public Believe?
Dreksler, N., Caviola, L., Chalmers, D., Allen, C., Rand, A., Lewis, J., Waggoner, P., Mays, K., & Sebo, J. (2025) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2506.11945 · Cited by 5
Döker, Y. F. (2025) · Law Technology and Humans · doi:10.5204/lthj.3757 · Cited by 5
Capitalism and the Very Long Term
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AI Alignment: The Case for Including Animals
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Critical Literacy in an AI World
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Belief updating in AI‐risk debates: Exploring the limits of adversarial collaboration
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All watched over by machines of loving grace—AI and control, symbolic violence, and the hyperreal
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AI Testing Should Account for Sophisticated Strategic Behaviour
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AI Rights for Human FlourishingPreprint
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International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled GuaranteesPreprint
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A Framework for Responsible AI in Higher Education
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AI Personalized Learning and the Risk of Epistemic Consolidation
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Metadata
- Authors
- Grace, K., Sandkühler, J. F., Stewart, H., Weinstein-Raun, B., Thomas, S., Stein-Perlman, Z., Salvatier, J., Brauner, J., & Korzekwa, R. C.
- Affiliations
- University of Bonn (DE)
- University of Oxford (GB)
- ORCID
- Venue
- Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
- Publisher
- AI Access Foundation
- Published
- 2025-10-06
- Volume
- 84
- ISSN
- 1076-9757 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4414876758
- Semantic Scholar
- 6f702f88f0d74a24f1ff06211975b30839ac2c58
- Cited by
- 201
- References
- 20
- Citations by year
- 2026: 64 · 2025: 72
- FWCI
- 35.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
- Funders
- Open Philanthropy Project
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Artificial Intelligence Applications
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Impact of AI and Big Data on Business and Society
- Keywords
- artificial intelligence forecasting, AI risks, human extinction risk, AI misinformation, authoritarianism, inequality, AI risk mitigation, participation bias
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-11-08, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-11-08 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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