The DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Effect of Corporate Governance on Bond Ratings and Yields: The Role of Institutional Investors and Outside Directors
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Cited by
Jiraporn, P., Jiraporn, N., Boeprasert, A., & Chang, K. (2014) · Financial Management · doi:10.1111/fima.12044 · Cited by 618
Managerial Ability and Credit Risk Assessment
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bhojraj, S., & Sengupta, P.
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2001
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2035663775
- Cited by
- 280
- References
- 45
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.