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Cited by 1,452

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade‐Off between Liquidity and Control?

Maug, Ernst·1998·The Journal of Finance
DOI 10.1111/0022-1082.35053
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Abstract

This paper analyzes the incentives of large shareholders to monitor public corporations. We investigate the hypothesis that a liquid stock market reduces large shareholders' incentives to monitor because it allows them to sell their stocks more easily. Even though this is true, a liquid market also makes it less costly to hold larger stakes and easier to purchase additional shares. We show that this fact is important if monitoring is costly: market liquidity mitigates the problem that small shareholders free ride on the effort of the large shareholder. We find that liquid stock markets are beneficial because they make corporate governance more effective.

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Metadata

Authors
Maug, E.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1998-02
Volume
53
Issue
1
Pages
65-98
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
DOI
10.1111/0022-1082.35053
OpenAlex
W2014182748
Cited by
1,452
References
25
FWCI
96.84
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade‐Off between Liquidity and Control? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/0022-1082.35053
The paper
Maug, E. (1998). Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade‐Off between Liquidity and Control? The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.35053

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.