The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Separation of Ownership and Control
Open accessAbstract
This paper analyzes the survival of organizations in which decision agents do not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their decisions. This is what the literature on large corporations calls separation of ownership and control. Such separation of decision and risk bearing functions is also common to organizations like large professional partnerships, financial mutuals and nonprofits. We contend that separation of decision and risk bearing functions survives in these organizations in part because of the benefits of specialization of management and risk bearing but also because of an effective common approach to controlling the implied agency problems. In particular, the contract structures of all these organizations separate the ratification and monitoring of decisions from the initiation and implementation of the decisions.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Endogeneity and the dynamics of internal corporate governance
Wintoki, M. B., Linck, J. S., & Netter, J. M. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.03.005 · Cited by 3,005
The experience and evolution of trust: Implications for cooperation and teamwork
Jones, G. R., & George, J. M. (1998) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/259293 · Cited by 2,135
The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation
Ahern, K. R., & Dittmar, A. K. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1364470 · Cited by 1,011
Gillan, S. L., & Starks, L. T. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.439500 · Cited by 697
Corporate Governance and Institutional Ownership
Chung, K. H., & Zhang, H. (2011) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109010000682 · Cited by 646
Connecting the Dots: Bringing External Corporate Governance into the Corporate Governance Puzzle
Aguilera, R. V., Desender, K. A., Bednar, M. K., & Lee, J. H. (2015) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/19416520.2015.1024503 · Cited by 502
Jensen, M., & Zajac, E. J. (2004) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.393 · Cited by 489
Self-citationDoes good corporate governance reduce information asymmetry around quarterly earnings announcements?
Kanagaretnam, K., Lobo, G. J., & Whalen, D. J. (2007) · Journal of Accounting and Public Policy · doi:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2007.05.003 · Cited by 395
Westphal, J. D., & Stern, I. (2007) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2007.24634434 · Cited by 356
KROLL, M., & WALTERS, B. A. (2007) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/20159920 · Cited by 268
Financial Distress and Corporate Governance: The Impact of Board Configuration
Brédart, X. (2014) · International Business Research · doi:10.5539/ibr.v7n3p72 · Cited by 72
Baan Wahh, W., Wong Sek Khin, E., & Abdullah, M. (2020) · Asian Journal of Accounting Perspectives · doi:10.22452/ajap.vol13no2.2 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C.
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1998
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1983465456
- Cited by
- 848
- References
- 27
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.