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Cited by 170Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEvolutionary Game Theory and CooperationCulture, Economy, and Development Studies

Does It Pay To Pray? Costly Ritual and Cooperation

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Ruffle, Bradley J., Sosis, Richard·2007·The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
DOI 10.2202/1935-1682.1629
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Abstract

Time-consuming and costly religious rituals pose a puzzle for economists committed to rational choice theories of human behavior. We propose that either through selection or a causal relationship, the performance of religious rituals is associated with higher levels of cooperation. To test this hypothesis we design field experiments to measure the in-group cooperative behavior of members of religious and secular Israeli kibbutzim, communal societies for which mutual cooperation is a matter of survival. Our results show that religious males (the primary practitioners of collective religious ritual in Orthodox Judaism) are more cooperative than religious females, secular males and secular females. Moreover, the frequency with which religious males engage in collective religious rituals predicts well their degree of cooperative behavior.

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  • Performing interpersonal rituals can improve closeness in groups even when group members do not reveal an explicit need for connection or belonging.

    “For example, performing interpersonal rituals can improve closeness in groups even when the group members do not reveal any explicit need for connection or belonging (Páez, Basabe, Ubillos, & González-Castro, 2007;Ruffle & Sosis, 2007;Sosis & Ruffle, 2003;Wen, Herrmann, & Legare, 2016).”

    From The Psychology of Rituals: An Integrative Review and Process-Based Framework (2018) · cites this paper as Ruffle & Sosis, 2007

  • Kibbutz members who more frequently engaged in communal religious rituals were more cooperative in a public goods game with other kibbutz members.

    “and kibbutz members who more frequently engaged in communal religious rituals were more cooperative in a public goods game with other kibbutz members (Ruffle & Sosis, 2007;Sosis & Ruffle, 2003).”

    From The Psychology of Rituals: An Integrative Review and Process-Based Framework (2018) · cites this paper as Ruffle & Sosis, 2007

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Authors
Ruffle, B. J., & Sosis, R.
Affiliations
  • Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (IL)
  • University of Connecticut (US)
ORCID
Venue
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
Publisher
Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Published
2007-03-29
Volume
7
Issue
1
ISSN
1935-1682 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2202/1935-1682.1629
OpenAlex
W2037158761
Cited by
170
References
2
Citations by year
2025: 8 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 16
FWCI
19.17
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • The B E Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Sage Foundation
  • University of Connecticut
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Demography › Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
Keywords
religious rituals, cooperation, costly signaling, kibbutz, Orthodox Judaism, in-group cooperation, gender differences, communal society, field experiments

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