Fairness in Extended Dictator Game Experiments
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We test the robustness of behavior in dictator games by offering allocators the choice to play an unattractive lottery. With this lottery option, mean transfers from allocators to recipients substantially decline, partly because many allocators now keep the entire endowment for themselves (without playing the lottery). In our standard dictator game, the median transfer amounts to 41% of the dictators' endowment. Once the lottery option is present, the median transfer falls to zero. Introducing an additional unattractive choice thus leads subjects to violate the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP).
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Citations
Cites
Fairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.159 · Cited by 3,239
Fairness and the assumptions of economics
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1986) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296367 · Cited by 2,463
Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., & Smith, V. (1994) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1994.1056 · Cited by 1,674
Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games.
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (1996) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1996.0081 · Cited by 1,126
On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games
List, J. A. (2007) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/519249 · Cited by 918
Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences, and Gender
Dohmen, T., & Falk, A. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.2.556 · Cited by 739
Cited by
Engel, C. (2011) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-011-9283-7 · Cited by 1,783
Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness
Dana, J., Weber, R. A., & Kuang, J. X. (2007) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-006-0153-z · Cited by 1,445
“16 See also, Oberholzer-Gee and Eichenberger (2004).”
Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects
(2009) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta7384 · Cited by 1,081
Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences, and Gender
Dohmen, T., & Falk, A. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.2.556 · Cited by 739
Sorting in Experiments with Application to Social Preferences
Lazear, E. P., Malmendier, U., & Weber, R. A. (2012) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.4.1.136 · Cited by 362
Metadata
- Authors
- Oberholzer-Gee, F., & Eichenberger, R.
- Venue
- The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Publisher
- Walter de Gruyter GmbH
- Published
- 2008-07-07
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 1
- ISSN
- 1935-1682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1970201609
- Cited by
- 42
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 10.41
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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