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Fairness in Extended Dictator Game Experiments

Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, Eichenberger, Reiner · 2008 · The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
Cited by 42

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

We test the robustness of behavior in dictator games by offering allocators the choice to play an unattractive lottery. With this lottery option, mean transfers from allocators to recipients substantially decline, partly because many allocators now keep the entire endowment for themselves (without playing the lottery). In our standard dictator game, the median transfer amounts to 41% of the dictators' endowment. Once the lottery option is present, the median transfer falls to zero. Introducing an additional unattractive choice thus leads subjects to violate the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP).

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Metadata

Authors
Oberholzer-Gee, F., & Eichenberger, R.
Venue
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
Published
2008-07-07
Volume
8
Issue
1
ISSN
1935-1682 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1970201609
Cited by
42
References
6
FWCI
10.41
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Fairness in Extended Dictator Game Experiments. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2202/1935-1682.1718
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Oberholzer-Gee, F., & Eichenberger, R. (2008). Fairness in Extended Dictator Game Experiments. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy. https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1682.1718

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