Occupational Licensing of a Credence Good: The Regulation of Midwifery
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A general theoretical and empirical model of the impact of regulation on supply and demand (prices and quantities) is developed in this paper. The regulation of midwifery services—of certified nurse‐tnidwives (CNMs)—relative to obstetricians (OBs) is analyzed within this framework. Demand‐side (quality assurance) effects are distinguished from supply‐side (Stigler‐Peltzman) effects in the model. Since both unambiguously predict a price increase, we focus on the regulatory impact on quantity. We find, within the empirical model, that while both effects are present, supply‐restricting effects dominate quality assurance in the U.S. market for CNM services. When mean regulations are compared to minimum regulations in the sample, CNM births increase from just under 6% of all births to a little over 11%. On net, regulation reduces the quantity of CNM births.
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“Perhaps the most important among these is the possibility that licensure could lead to higher prices and reduced access to the service in question, causing consumers to substitute towards cheaper, inferior alternatives (Shepard 1978; Adams et al. 2003; Kleiner and Kudrle 2000; Kleiner et al. 2014).”
From The Effect of Occupational Licensing on Consumer Welfare: Early Midwifery Laws and Maternal Mortality (2016) · cites this paper as Adams et al. 2003
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Citations
Cites
Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud
Darby, M. R., & Karni, E. (1973) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466756 · Cited by 3,947
Investment, Moral Hazard, and Occupational Licensing
Shapiro, C. (1986) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297722 · Cited by 338
State laws and the practice of lay midwifery.
Butter, I. H., & Kay, B. J. (1988) · American Journal of Public Health · doi:10.2105/ajph.78.9.1161 · Cited by 22
Cited by
Occupational Licensing and Maternal Health: Evidence from Early Midwifery Laws
Anderson, D. M., Brown, R., Charles, K. K., & Rees, D. I. (2020) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/710555 · Cited by 98
Anderson, D. M., Brown, R., Charles, K. K., & Rees, D. (2016) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w22456 · Cited by 19
Long-Term Health Benefits of Occupational Licensing: Evidence from Midwifery Laws
Noghanibehambari, H., & Fletcher, J. (2023) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2023.102807 · Cited by 15
Metadata
- Authors
- III, A. F. A., Jr., R. B. E., & Jackson, J. D.
- Venue
- Southern Economic Journal
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2003-01
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 659
- ISSN
- 0038-4038
- Cited by
- 16
- References
- 3
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- III, A. F. A., Jr., R. B. E., & Jackson, J. D. (2003). Occupational Licensing of a Credence Good: The Regulation of Midwifery. Southern Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2307/1061700
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.