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Cited by 425

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Auctioning Conservation Contracts: A Theoretical Analysis and an Application

Open access
Latacz‐Lohmann, Uwe, Van der Hamsvoort, Carel·1997·American Journal of Agricultural Economics

Abstract

Auction theory is used to analyze the potential benefits of auctions in allocating contracts for the provision of nonmarket goods in the countryside. A model of optimal bidding for conservation contracts is developed and applied to a hypothetical conservation program. Competitive bidding, compared to fixed‐rate payments, can increase the cost effectiveness of conservation contracting significantly. The cost revelation mechanism inherent in the bidding process makes auctions a powerful means by which to reduce the problems of information asymmetry. Strategic bidding behavior, which may adversely affect the performance of sequential auctions, is difficult to address by means of auction design.

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Metadata

Authors
Latacz‐Lohmann, U., & Van der Hamsvoort, C.
Venue
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1997-05
Volume
79
Issue
2
Pages
407-418
ISSN
  • 0002-9092 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-8276
OpenAlex
W2011817716
Cited by
425
References
1
FWCI
3.21
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Auctioning Conservation Contracts: A Theoretical Analysis and an Application. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/1244139
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Latacz‐Lohmann, U., & Van der Hamsvoort, C. (1997). Auctioning Conservation Contracts: A Theoretical Analysis and an Application. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/1244139

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.