The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Auctioning Conservation Contracts: A Theoretical Analysis and an Application
Open accessAbstract
Auction theory is used to analyze the potential benefits of auctions in allocating contracts for the provision of nonmarket goods in the countryside. A model of optimal bidding for conservation contracts is developed and applied to a hypothetical conservation program. Competitive bidding, compared to fixed‐rate payments, can increase the cost effectiveness of conservation contracting significantly. The cost revelation mechanism inherent in the bidding process makes auctions a powerful means by which to reduce the problems of information asymmetry. Strategic bidding behavior, which may adversely affect the performance of sequential auctions, is difficult to address by means of auction design.
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Citations
Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Myerson, R. B. (1981) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.6.1.58 · Cited by 5,920
McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1986) · Scholarship@Western (Western University) · Cited by 2,240
Auctions and Bidding: A Primer
Milgrom, P. (1989) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.3.3.3 · Cited by 846
McMillan, J. (1994) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.8.3.145 · Cited by 699
The Economics of Uncertainty and Information.
Loomes, G., & Laffont, J.-J. (1992) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2555080 · Cited by 365
Attitudes and Farmer Conservation Behavior
Lynne, G. D., Shonkwiler, J. S., & Rola, L. R. (1988) · American Journal of Agricultural Economics · doi:10.2307/1241971 · Cited by 285
Government Decision Making and Program Performance: The Case of the Conservation Reserve Program
Reichelderfer, K., & Boggess, W. G. (1988) · American Journal of Agricultural Economics · doi:10.2307/1241970 · Cited by 178
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Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services
Ferraro, P. J. (2008) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.07.029 · Cited by 583
Paying for the hydrological services of Mexico's forests: Analysis, negotiations and results
Muñoz-Piña, C., Guevara, A., Torres, J. M., & Braña, J. (2008) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.07.031 · Cited by 574
Payments for ecosystem services: A review and comparison of developing and industrialized countries
Schomers, S., & Matzdorf, B. (2013) · Ecosystem Services · doi:10.1016/j.ecoser.2013.01.002 · Cited by 528
Auctions for conservation contracts: an empirical examination of Victoria's BushTender trial
Stoneham, G., Chaudhri, V., Ha, A., & Strappazzon, L. (2003) · Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8489.2003.t01-1-00224.x · Cited by 486
Cost-effective design of agri-environmental payment programs: U.S. experience in theory and practice
Claassen, R., Cattaneo, A., & Johansson, R. (2008) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.07.032 · Cited by 400
Metadata
- Authors
- Latacz‐Lohmann, U., & Van der Hamsvoort, C.
- Venue
- American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1997-05
- Volume
- 79
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 407-418
- ISSN
- 0002-9092 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8276
- OpenAlex
- W2011817716
- Cited by
- 425
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 3.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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