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Cited by 583

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Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services

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Ferraro, Paul J.·2008·Ecological Economics
DOI 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.07.029
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Research works printed but not linked: 42

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Metadata

Authors
Ferraro, P. J.
Venue
Ecological Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2008-05
Volume
65
Issue
4
Pages
810-821
ISSN
0921-8009 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.07.029
OpenAlex
W2011358054
Cited by
583
References
0
FWCI
22.87
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)

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Ferraro, P. J. (2008). Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services. Ecological Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.07.029

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