The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance
Abstract
Centralization of wage bargaining Lars Calmfors and John Driffill The structure of labour markets is increasingly perceived as a determinant of the macroeconomic performance of a country. This article focuses on one aspect of labour markets, the degree of centralization of wage setting. The main conclusion is that extremes work best. Either highly centralized systems with national bargaining (such as in Austria and the Nordic countries), or highly decentralized systems with wage setting at the level of individual firms (such as in Japan, Switzerland and the US) seem to perform well. The worst outcomes with respect to employment may well be found in systems with an intermediate degree of centralization (such as in Belgium and the Netherlands). This conclusion is reasonably well supported by the available empirical evidence. It is also logical. Indeed, large and all-encompassing trade unions naturally recognize their market power and take into account both the inflationary and unemployment effects of wage increases. Conversely, unions operating at the individual firm or plant level have very limited market power. In intermediate cases, unions can exert some market power but are led to ignore the macroeconomic implications of their actions. These conclusions challenge the conventional wisdom which asserts that the more ‘corporatist’ is an economy, the better is its economic performance.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Rubinstein, A. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912531 · Cited by 5,264
The Rise and Decline of Nations.
Beckerman, W., & Olson, M. (1983) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232759 · Cited by 2,792
Blair, W. F., Hall, E. R., & Kelson, K. R. (1959) · The Southwestern Naturalist · doi:10.2307/3669094 · Cited by 2,480
Hysteresis and the European Unemployment Problem
Blanchard, O., & Summers, L. (1986) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w1950 · Cited by 1,330
The Estimation of Animal Abundance
Cox, D. R., & Seber, G. A. F. (1975) · International Statistical Review / Revue Internationale de Statistique · doi:10.2307/1402924 · Cited by 764
Layard, R., & Nickell, S. (1986) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2554377 · Cited by 621
UNIONS, REAL WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT IN BRITAIN 1951–79
NICKELL, S. J., & ANDREWS, M. (1983) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041610 · Cited by 464
ADAPTIVE FEATURES OF MAMMALIAN REPRODUCTION
Millar, J. S. (1977) · Evolution · doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.1977.tb01019.x · Cited by 399
Correspondence of Food Habits and Morphology in Insectivorous Bats
Freeman, P. W. (1981) · Journal of Mammalogy · doi:10.2307/1380489 · Cited by 258
The economics of worldwide stagflation
Rogerson, R. (1987) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(87)90033-x · Cited by 240
Cited by
Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies
Esping-Andersen, G. (1999) · doi:10.1093/0198742002.001.0001 · Cited by 6,253
The New Politics of the Welfare State
(2001) · doi:10.1093/0198297564.001.0001 · Cited by 3,228
Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State
Estevez‐Abe, M., Iversen, T., & Soskice, D. (2001) · Varieties of Capitalism · doi:10.1093/0199247757.003.0004 · Cited by 1,568
The Retirement Decision in OECD Countries
(1999) · OECD Economics Department Working Papers · doi:10.1787/565174210530 · Cited by 573
Coping With Permanent Austerity Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies
(2001) · The New Politics of the Welfare State · doi:10.1093/0198297564.003.0014 · Cited by 527
Traxler, F., Blaschke, S., & Kittel, B. (2001) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198295549.001.0001 · Cited by 523
How Unregulated Is the U.S. Labor Market? The Penal System as a Labor Market Institution
Western, B., & Beckett, K. (1999) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/210135 · Cited by 489
Market‐oriented institutions and policies and economic growth: A critical survey
De Haan, J., Lundström, S., & Sturm, J. (2006) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/j.0950-0804.2006.00278.x · Cited by 474
Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance
Alvarez, R. M., Garrett, G., & Lange, P. (1991) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1963174 · Cited by 465
Centralisation of Wage Bargaining and Macroeconomic Performance: A Survey
(1993) · OECD Economics Department Working Papers · doi:10.1787/521405217277 · Cited by 428
Macroeconomic Performance and Collective Bargaining: An International Perspective
Flanagan, R. J. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.3.1150 · Cited by 419
Central bank independence, centralization of wage bargaining, inflation and unemployment:
Cukierman, A., & Lippi, F. (1999) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00128-7 · Cited by 416
Employment Patterns in OECD Countries: Reassessing the Role of Policies and Institutions
(2006) · OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers · doi:10.1787/702031136412 · Cited by 403
'New' Views on the Optimum Currency Area Theory: What is Emu Telling Us?
Mongelli, F. P. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.357400 · Cited by 354
Unemployment: Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market
Layard, R., Nickell, S., & Jackman, R. (2005) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199279166.001.0001 · Cited by 325
Immediate challenges for the European Central Bank
Dornbusch, R., Favero, C., & Giavazzi, F. (1998) · Economic Policy · doi:10.1111/1468-0327.00028 · Cited by 320
Self-citationFiscal Decentralisation and Economic Growth in High‐Income OECD Countries
Thiessen, U. (2003) · Fiscal Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1475-5890.2003.tb00084.x · Cited by 317
When the appeal of a dominant leader is greater than a prestige leader
Kakkar, H., & Sivanathan, N. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1617711114 · Cited by 254
Partially Independent Central Banks, Politically Responsive Governments, and Inflation
Franzese, R. J. (1999) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2991831 · Cited by 253
The Political Economy of Imprisonment in Affluent Western Democracies, 1960–1990
Sutton, J. R. (2004) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.1177/000312240406900202 · Cited by 213
ON THE ASSESSMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF 'INSTITUTIONAL' REMEDIES
FORDER, J. (1996) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028560 · Cited by 136
Wage Dispersion and Decentralization of Wage Bargaining
Dahl, C. M., le Maire, D., & Munch, J. R. (2013) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/669339 · Cited by 126
The employment effects of collective wage bargaining
Fanfani, B. (2023) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.105006 · Cited by 17
Metadata
- Authors
- Calmfors, L., Driffill, J., Honkapohja, S., & Giavazzi, F.
- Venue
- Economic Policy
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1988-04
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 13
- ISSN
- 0266-4658 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2085752922
- Cited by
- 2,360
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 73.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.