The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy
The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Abstract
This is a paperback reprint of a collection of contributed essays about mysticism and philosophy. It challenges the widely accepted interpretaion of mystical experience that received its fullest expression in two volumes edited by Steven T. Katz: Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis (OUP 1987) and Mysticism and Religious Traditions (OUP 1983). According to Katz and his colleagues, mystical experience, can be explained as the constructed and mediated product of previously held beliefs and concepts. On this view, there is no such thing as 'universal' mystical experience. The present volume attempts to show that there is a single type of mystical experience that cuts across cultural and linguistic lines. This is the experience of 'pure consciousnes,' a state in which the subject remains conscious but experiences neither thought, sensation, feeling, nor object of consciousness. Part I of the book demonstrates that there are well-attested reports of pure consciousness events occuring in a wide variety of ages and traditions, including Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, and Hinduism. The essays in Part II consider the philosophical implications of these reports, arguing that there are no logical blocks to the claim of pure consciousness events.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Meditation states and traits: EEG, ERP, and neuroimaging studies.
Cahn, B. R., & Polich, J. (2006) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.132.2.180 · Cited by 1,734
Buddhist Modernism and the Rhetoric of Meditative Experience
Sharf, R. (1995) · Numen · doi:10.1163/1568527952598549 · Cited by 394
Phenomenology, Structure, and Dynamic of Psychedelic States
Preller, K. H., & Vollenweider, F. X. (2016) · Current Topics in Behavioral Neurosciences · doi:10.1007/7854_2016_459 · Cited by 282
Pharmacological, neural, and psychological mechanisms underlying psychedelics: A critical review
van Elk, M., & Yaden, D. B. (2022) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2022.104793 · Cited by 221
“As such, the experience can only be approximated by using metaphorical language or it needs to be experienced from a first person perspective in order to truly understand what is meant by a mystical experience (Forman, 1990).”
BackgroundIs Mindfulness Buddhist? (and Why It Matters)
Sharf, R. H. (2015) · Transcultural Psychiatry · doi:10.1177/1363461514557561 · Cited by 226
Why Does Space Feel the Way it Does? Towards a Principled Account of Spatial Experience
Haun, A., & Tononi, G. (2019) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e21121160 · Cited by 143
“Background activity in cortical grids should support a pure experience of space also in the absence of perceived objects and while disconnected from external inputs, as can be achieved during certain dreams [48] or meditation states [49].”
BackgroundRethinking Meditation: Buddhist Practice in the Ancient and Modern Worlds
McMahan, D. L. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197661741.001.0001 · Cited by 26
Knowing Blue: Early Buddhist Accounts of Non-Conceptual Sense Perception
Sharf, R. (2017) · Philosophy East and West · doi:10.1353/pew.0.0126 · Cited by 7
Dissociating Artificial Intelligence from Artificial Consciousness
Findlay, G., Marshall, W., Albantakis, L., David, I., Mayner, W. G., Koch, C., & Tononi, G. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2412.04571 · Cited by 41
“We can be conscious even when we are not doing, thinking, or saying anything, as in “pure presence” meditation [64, 65]; in dreaming sleep, when we are not inter-acting with the environment [66]; under certain psychedelics [67], or under ketamine anesthesia [68].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Barbiero, D., & Forman, R. K. C.
- Venue
- Philosophy East and West
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993-10
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 766
- ISSN
- 0031-8221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2044384749
- Cited by
- 184
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 3.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.