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Why Does Space Feel the Way it Does? Towards a Principled Account of Spatial Experience
Open accessAbstract
There must be a reason why an experience feels the way it does. A good place to begin addressing this question is spatial experience, because it may be more penetrable by introspection than other qualities of consciousness such as color or pain. Moreover, much of experience is spatial, from that of our body to the visual world, which appears as if painted on an extended canvas in front of our eyes. Because it is ‘right there’, we usually take space for granted and overlook its qualitative properties. However, we should realize that a great number of phenomenal distinctions and relations are required for the canvas of space to feel ‘extended’. Here we argue that, to be experienced as extended, the canvas of space must be composed of countless spots, here and there, small and large, and these spots must be related to each other in a characteristic manner through connection, fusion, and inclusion. Other aspects of the structure of spatial experience follow from extendedness: every spot can be experienced as enclosing a particular region, with its particular location, size, boundary, and distance from other spots. We then propose an account of the phenomenal properties of spatial experiences based on integrated information theory (IIT). The theory provides a principled approach for characterizing both the quantity and quality of experience by unfolding the cause-effect structure of a physical substrate. Specifically, we show that a simple simulated substrate of units connected in a grid-like manner yields a cause-effect structure whose properties can account for the main properties of spatial experience. These results uphold the hypothesis that our experience of space is supported by brain areas whose units are linked by a grid-like connectivity. They also predict that changes in connectivity, even in the absence of changes in activity, should lead to a warping of experienced space. To the extent that this approach provides an initial account of phenomenal space, it may also serve as a starting point for investigating other aspects of the quality of experience and their physical correspondents.
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![Figure 3 Characterization of a causal distinction. (A) Any subset of units can be considered as a candidate mechanism. One such candidate mechanism, illustrated here (in pink), is constituted by units CD in the current state CD = [0, 0] (0 in white and 1 in yellow). Any subset of units in a state can be considered as a candidate cause (in brown) or effect (in green). (B) Four candidate effect purviews. Each effect is represented as the probability p of a future state of a subset of units (a purview) given the current state of the mechanism, for example for CDout = [0, 0], p = 0.996. (C) For each effect purview, the mechanism is partitioned (red dashed line) in the way that minimizes the difference between unpartitioned and partitioned effects. Each partitioned effect is represented as pMIP. (D) The intrinsic difference d between the partitioned and unpartitioned effects for the four candidate effects. The maximally-irreducible effect (the effect for which d is maximal) is CDout = [0, 0].](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/d8f9f982b75845bcb70b72302e8223bf/why-does-space-feel-the-way-it-does-towards-a-principled-account-of-spatial-figure-3.jpg)

![Figure 5 Characterization of a causal relation. (A) Two effects BCD/<BCDout> and CDE/<CDEout>. (B) These two effects are congruent over the units CD = [0, 0]. This allows for three candidate intrinsic overlaps, C = [0], D = [0], and CD = [0, 0]. (C) The candidate relation is partitioned so as to minimize the difference between the unpartitioned and partitioned causes and effects. (D) For each candidate overlap, the intrinsic difference is assessed on each effect involved, and these are summed over causes and effects. (E) The overlap CD = [0, 0] is maximally irreducible (in purple), so this is the overlap that exists intrinsically for these two effects, binding them together.](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/98528f4015384e20abdb224a9d546d00/why-does-space-feel-the-way-it-does-towards-a-principled-account-of-spatial-figure-5.jpg)




![Figure 10 Inhomogeneities. (A) 1D grid in the all-Off state. (B) The same grid in an inhomogeneous state, with CDEF-On: The cause-effect structure remains similar to the All-Off state, with the same mechanisms existing in both states. (C) As shown by its context, the distinction CDEF exists in both the all-Off and CDEF-On states. The relations between CDEF and the rest of the structure are qualitatively similar for both states. Colors indicate connection (open pale-brown symbols), inclusion up (blue), inclusion down (orange), and self-inclusion. (D) The difference in the context of CDEF for the all-Off and CDEF-On states (φR[all-Off] − φR[CDEF-On]). Solid symbols represent increased φR, hollow symbols represent decreased φR. The subtext of CDEF is generally more irreducible (higher φR) in the CDEF-On state, whereas its supertext and its connections are generally more reducible (lower φR).](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/2fe05310b7df4e29813318019747f3ac/why-does-space-feel-the-way-it-does-towards-a-principled-account-of-spatial-figure-10.jpg)
![Figure 11 Attentional Highlighting. (A) 1D grid in the ‘unattended’ all-Off state. (B) The 1D grid in the ‘attended’ all-Off state: to simulate the ‘spotlight’ of attention, units CDEF have increased response gain (red lines). (C) The distinction CDEF exists for both the unattended and attended grids. The relations between CDEF and the rest of the structure are qualitatively similar for both the unattended and attended grids. Colors are as in Figure 10. (D) The difference in the context of CDEF for the attended and unattended grids (φR[unattended] − φR[attended]). Symbol scaling is greater by a factor of 1.5 relative to Figure 10D. The context of CDEF is generally more irreducible when the gain of CDEF is increased by the ‘spotlight’ of attention.](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/214c2cadb80d4068aed106b6eb093ddf/why-does-space-feel-the-way-it-does-towards-a-principled-account-of-spatial-figure-11.jpg)



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“IIT 4.0 presents a more complete, self-consistent formulation and incorporates several recent advances [10–13].”
From Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“In the brain, a large part of the cerebral cortex, especially its posterior regions, is organized as a dense, divergent-convergent hierarchical 3D lattice of specialized units, which makes it a plausible candidate for the substrate of human consciousness [4, 11, 51, 52].”
From Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“In the brain, a large part of the cerebral cortex, especially its posterior regions, is organized as a dense, divergent-convergent hierarchical 3D lattice of specialized units, which makes it a plausible candidate for the substrate of human consciousness [4, 11, 51, 52].”
From Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“For IIT the cause-effect structure of grid-like cortices with recurrent pyramid-like, convergent-divergent connections (such as those found in posterior areas) (Figure 7B) is thought to correspond to a maximum of complexity and thus be sufficient for conscious experience.96,97”
From An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [97]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“IIT suggests that a complex of maximum phi probably resides primarily in the posterior cerebral cortex, in a temporo–parietal–occipital ‘hot zone’”
From Adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness (2025) · cites this paper as [25]
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Citations
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Cited by
Seth, A. K., & Bayne, T. (2022) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4 · Cited by 880
Albantakis, L., Barbosa, L., Findlay, G., Grasso, M., Haun, A. M., Marshall, W., Mayner, W. G. P., Zaeemzadeh, A., Boly, M., Juel, B. E., et al. (2023) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011465 · Cited by 292
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InfluentialSelf-citationConsciousness and complexity: a consilience of evidence
Sarasso, S., Casali, A. G., Casarotto, S., Rosanova, M., Sinigaglia, C., & Massimini, M. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab023 · Cited by 171
“…in a grid-like manner are hot spots for complexity and whether they are fundamental for sustaining the presence of consciousness and account for phenomenal properties, such as the experience of extended space (Haun and Tononi 2019), would provide valuable data to inform theoretical debates.”
Predictive processing as a systematic basis for identifying the neural correlates of consciousness
Hohwy, J., & Seth, A. (2020) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2020.ii.64 · Cited by 170
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Lamme, V. A. F. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00083 · Cited by 136
Metadata
- Authors
- Haun, A., & Tononi, G.
- Affiliations
- University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
- Corresponding author
- Haun, Andrew
- Tononi, Giulio
- Venue
- Entropy
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2019-11-27
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 1160
- ISSN
- 1099-4300 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC7514505
- OpenAlex
- W2989880046
- Cited by
- 143
- References
- 89
- Citations by year
- 2026: 12 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 21 · 2021: 26 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 1
- FWCI
- 18.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- dx.doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Entropy (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- Tiny Blue Dot Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
- Keywords
- spatial experience, phenomenal space, integrated information theory, qualia, causal structure, phenomenal properties, self-reflection, consciousness
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