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In Defense of the Contract at Will
Abstract
In the remainder of this paper, I examine the arguments that can be made for and against the contract at will. I hope to show that it is adopted not because it allows the employer to exploit the employee, but rather because over a very broad range of circumstances it works to the mutual benefit of both parties, where the benefits are measured, as ever, at the time of the contract's formation and not at the time of dispute. To justify this result, I examine the contract in light of the three dominant standards that have emerged as the test of the soundness of any legal doctrine: intrinsic fairness, effects upon utility or wealth, and distributional consequences. I conclude that the first two tests point strongly to the maintenance of the at-will rule, while the third, if it offers any guidance at all, points in the same direction.
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Citations
Cited by
Autor, D. H. (2003) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/344122 · Cited by 1,534
Wrongful Discharge Laws and Innovation
Acharya, V. V., Baghai, R. P., & Subramanian, K. V. (2014) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hht009 · Cited by 579
Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation
Macleod, W. B. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803321455232 · Cited by 424
The Costs of Wrongful-Discharge Laws
Autor, D. H., Donohue, J. J., & Schwab, S. J. (2006) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest.88.2.211 · Cited by 404
Autor, D. H. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.281431 · Cited by 397
Governing the Firm: Workers' Control in Theory and Practice
Dow, G. K. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511615849 · Cited by 278
Metadata
- Authors
- Epstein, R. A.
- Venue
- The University of Chicago Law Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1984
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 947
- ISSN
- 0041-9494 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1530834736
- Cited by
- 199
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 15.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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