Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 424

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation

Macleod, W. Bentley · 2003 · American Economic Review

Abstract

This paper extends the standard principal–agent model to allow for subjective evaluation. The optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case with verifiable performance measures. Moreover, discrimination against an individual implies lower pay and performance, suggesting that the extent of discrimination as measured after controlling for performance may underestimate the level of true discrimination. Finally, the optimal contract entails the use of bonus pay rather than the threat of dismissal, hence neither “efficiency wages” nor the right to dismiss an employee are necessary ingredients for an optimal incentive contract.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1257/000282803321455232

Cites

27 of 27 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 27 references

Cited by

See all 424

Metadata

Authors
Macleod, W. B.
Venue
American Economic Review
Published
2003-02-01
Volume
93
Issue
1
Pages
216-240
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3124269332
Cited by
424
References
27
FWCI
15.44
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/000282803321455232
The paper
Macleod, W. B. (2003). Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803321455232

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.