The DOI matches its Crossref record.
A General Theory of Executive Compensation Based on Statistically Tested Propositions
Abstract
Introduction, 270. — I. Description of sample and definition of terms, 271. — II. Compensation and industry, 273; compensation, profit and size, 275; executive mobility, 279. — III. Position of the individual firm, 283. — IV. Executive compensation and the theoretical model, 288. — V. Implications, 293.
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Citations
Cited by
Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?*
Gabaix, X., & Landier, A. (2008) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.49 · Cited by 1,764
Chapter 38 Executive compensation
Murphy, K. J. (1999) · Handbook of Labor Economics · doi:10.1016/s1573-4463(99)30024-9 · Cited by 1,567
On the Efficiency of Internal and External Corporate Control Mechanisms
Walsh, J. P., & Seward, J. K. (1990) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1990.4308826 · Cited by 1,017
How Much Does Performance Matter? A Meta-Analysis of CEO Pay Studies
Tosi, H. L., Werner, S., Katz, J. P., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2000) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/014920630002600207 · Cited by 979
Power Laws in Economics and Finance
Gabaix, X. (2009) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.142940 · Cited by 907
HOW MUCH DOES THE CEO MATTER? THE ROLE OF MANAGERIAL DISCRETION IN THE SETTING OF CEO COMPENSATION.
Finkelstein, S., & Boyd, B. K. (1998) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/257101 · Cited by 799
Murphy, K. J. (1999) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.163914 · Cited by 681
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Frydman, C., & Jenter, D. (2010) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-120209-133958 · Cited by 542
MANAGERIAL CONTROL, PERFORMANCE, AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Tosi, H., & Hinkin, T. (1987) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/255895 · Cited by 509
Power Laws in Economics and Finance
Gabaix, X. (2008) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w14299 · Cited by 487
CEO compensation and bank mergers
Bliss, R. (2001) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00057-5 · Cited by 445
Power Laws in Economics: An Introduction
Gabaix, X. (2016) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.30.1.185 · Cited by 435
Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?
MORSE, A., NANDA, V., & SERU, A. (2011) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01687.x · Cited by 432
Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Top-Management Compensation: Theory and Evidence
Cyert, R. M., Kang, S.-H., & Kumar, P. (2002) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.48.4.453.205 · Cited by 431
Reframing Execufive Compensation: An Assessment and Outlook
Gomez-Mejia, L., & Wiseman, R. M. (1997) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/014920639702300304 · Cited by 403
Matching compensation and organizational strategies
Balkin, D. B., & Gomez‐Mejia, L. R. (1990) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250110207 · Cited by 365
Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?
Gabaix, X., & Landier, A. (2006) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w12365 · Cited by 276
Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer
Edmans, A., & Gabaix, X. (2016) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20161153 · Cited by 270
Metadata
- Authors
- Roberts, D. R.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1956-05
- Volume
- 70
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 270
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2098099714
- Cited by
- 168
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.