The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information
Abstract
This paper shows that under plausible assumptions, the inability of lenders to discover all of the relevant characteristics of borrowers results in investment in excess of the socially efficient level. Raising the rate of interest above the free market level will restore optimality. This conflicts with generally held views and is contrasted with the Stiglitz-Weiss model. It is shown that the assumptions which yield overinvestment support debt as the equilibrium method of finance. However, under the Stiglitz-Weiss assumptions, used to derive an underinvestment result, equity is shown to be the equilibrium method of finance.
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Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769
Cited by
Berger, A. N., & Udell, G. F. (2002) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00682 · Cited by 1,882
Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries With a Consumer Credit Field Experiment
(2009) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta5781 · Cited by 503
Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect
Ghatak, M. (2000) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00556 · Cited by 416
The Borrower's Curse: Optimism, Finance and Entrepreneurship
de Meza, D., & Southey, C. (1996) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2235253 · Cited by 398
Do financial constraints hold back innovation and growth?
Hyytinen, A., & Toivanen, O. (2005) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/j.respol.2005.06.004 · Cited by 371
Metadata
- Authors
- Meza, D. D., & Webb, D. C.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1987-05
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 281
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2083335474
- Cited by
- 879
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 18.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Meza, D. D., & Webb, D. C. (1987). Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/1885064
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.