The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information
Abstract
This paper shows that under plausible assumptions, the inability of lenders to discover all of the relevant characteristics of borrowers results in investment in excess of the socially efficient level. Raising the rate of interest above the free market level will restore optimality. This conflicts with generally held views and is contrasted with the Stiglitz-Weiss model. It is shown that the assumptions which yield overinvestment support debt as the equilibrium method of finance. However, under the Stiglitz-Weiss assumptions, used to derive an underinvestment result, equity is shown to be the equilibrium method of finance.
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Citations
Cites
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Metadata
- Authors
- Meza, D. D., & Webb, D. C.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1987-05
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 281
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2083335474
- Cited by
- 879
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 18.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.