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Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent
Abstract
We compare how much profit an owner of a patented cost-reducing invention can realize by licensing it to an oligopolistic industry producing a homogeneous product, by means of a fixed fee or a per unit royalty. Our analysis is conducted in terms of a noncooperative game involving n + 1 players: the inventor and the n firms. In this game the inventor acts as a Stackelberg leader, and it has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. It is shown that licensing by means of a fixed fee is superior to licensing by means of a royalty for both the inventor and consumers. Only a “drastic” innovation is licensed to a single producer.
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Citations
Cited by
Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements
Bulow, J. I., Geanakoplos, J. D., & Klemperer, P. D. (1985) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261312 · Cited by 2,523
Gans, J. S., & Stern, S. (2003) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/s0048-7333(02)00103-8 · Cited by 1,294
The Structure of Licensing Contracts
Anand, B. N., & Khanna, T. (2000) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00114 · Cited by 545
How to License Intangible Property
Katz, M. L., & Shapiro, C. (1986) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885697 · Cited by 506
Technology Transfer under Asymmetric Information
Gallini, N. T., & Wright, B. D. (1990) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555500 · Cited by 487
Licensing the market for technology
Arora, A., & Fosfuri, A. (2003) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00002-7 · Cited by 443
Chapter 14 The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion
Reinganum, J. F. (1989) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(89)01017-4 · Cited by 423
A monopolistic market for information
Admati, A. R., & Pfleiderer, P. (1986) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(86)90052-9 · Cited by 317
Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
Kamien, M. I., Oren, S. S., & Tauman, Y. (1992) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(92)90036-7 · Cited by 303
Self-citationExternal Verifiability of Accounting Information and Intangible Asset Transactions
Kim-Gina, J. (2018) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3186175 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Kamien, M. I., & Tauman, Y.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1986-08
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 471
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2066949090
- Cited by
- 632
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 13.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.