The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Subgame Perfect Implementation
Abstract
This paper examines the use of stage mechanisms in implementation problems and provides a partial characterization of the set of subgam e perfect implementable choice rules. It is shown that, in many economic environments, virtually an y choice rule can be implemented. To illustrate the power of this approach, the paper discusses a number of models in which it is possible to implement the first-best (although it wouldn't have been possible to do so without using stage mechanisms). The diversity of these models suggests that subgame perfect implementation may find wide application. Copyright 1988 by The Econometric Society.
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Citations
Cites
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Selten, R. (1975) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01766400 · Cited by 3,337
Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
Palfrey, T. R., & Srivastava, S. (1991) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938266 · Cited by 162
Cited by
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Separation of Powers and Political Accountability
Persson, T., Roland, G., & Tabellini, G. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555457 · Cited by 1,171
Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
Maskin, E., & Tirole, J. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00079 · Cited by 775
Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
Aghion, P., Dewatripont, M., & Rey, P. (1994) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951613 · Cited by 572
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2013) · Handbook of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-53759-1.00002-9 · Cited by 480
Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts
Segal, I. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00078 · Cited by 377
A crash course in implementation theory
Jackson, M. O. (2001) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s003550100152 · Cited by 372
Incentives Between Firms (and Within)
Gibbons, R. (2005) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0229 · Cited by 362
Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
Rogerson, W. P. (1992) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297997 · Cited by 356
Metadata
- Authors
- Moore, J., & Repullo, R.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1988-09
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1191
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2089994460
- Cited by
- 460
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 33.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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