The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
Open accessAbstract
The situation in which a principal-agent relationship is repeated finitely many times (T) is formulated as a sequential game.For any Pareto-optimal cooperative arrangement in the one-period game that dominates a one-period Nash equilibrium, and any positive number epsilon, there exists for every sufficiently large T a (noncooperative) epsilon equilibrium of the T-period game that yields each player an average expected utility that is at least his expected utility in the one-period cooperative arrangement, less epsilon. 'This is a revision and extension of "Monitoring Cooperative Agreements between Principals and Agents," Tech. Report No. 3, Center on Decision and Conflict in Complex Organizations, Harvard University,
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Selten, R. (1975) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01766400 · Cited by 3,337
Groves, T. (1973) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914085 · Cited by 3,284
A Course in Probability Theory
(1974) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/c2009-0-22097-6 · Cited by 2,668
A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship
Simon, H. A. (1951) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1906815 · Cited by 1,314
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship
Shavell, S. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003319 · Cited by 1,285
16. Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games
Aumann, R. J. (1959) · Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-40), Volume IV · doi:10.1515/9781400882168-018 · Cited by 886
The Expected Sample Size of Some Tests of Power One
Robbins, H. E., & Siegmund, D. (1974) · The Annals of Statistics · doi:10.1214/aos/1176342704 · Cited by 126
Altruism as an outcome of social interaction
Kurz, M. (1978) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 65
Cited by
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Jarillo, J. C. (1988) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250090104 · Cited by 2,555
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1983) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912246 · Cited by 2,095
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1992) · Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_16 · Cited by 1,913
INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION WITHOUT SANCTIONS: THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY'S RESPONSIBLE CARE PROGRAM.
King, A. A., & Lenox, M. J. (2000) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/1556362 · Cited by 1,670
Metadata
- Authors
- Radner, R.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1981-09
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1127
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2165408566
- Cited by
- 405
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 18.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.