Approval Voting
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Approval voting is a method of voting in which voters can vote for (“approve of”) as many candidates as they wish in an election. This article analyzes properties of this method and compares it with other single-ballot nonranked voting systems. Among the theorems proved is that approval voting is the most sincere and most strategyproof of all such voting systems; in addition, it is the only system that ensures the choice of a Condorcet majority candidate if the preferences of voters are dichotomous. Its probable empirical effects would be to (1) increase voter turnout, (2) increase the likelihood of a majority winner in plurality contests and thereby both obviate the need for runoff elections and reinforce the legitimacy of first-ballot outcomes, and (3) help centrist candidates, without at the same time denying voters the opportunity to express their support for more extremist candidates. The latter effect's institutional impact may be to weaken the two-party system yet preserve middle-of-the-road public policies of which most voters approve.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Approval voting is particularly useful for efficiently identifying the most acceptable choice [37], as it has been deemed the most “sincere and strategy proof” form of voting [38].”
From A refined compilation of implementation strategies: results from the Expert Recommendations for Implementing Change (ERIC) project (2015) · cites this paper as [38]
Citations
Cites
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
Gibbard, A. (1973) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914083 · Cited by 3,202
Satterthwaite, M. A. (1975) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2 · Cited by 2,821
A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
May, K. O. (1952) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907651 · Cited by 1,555
Condorcet Social Choice Functions
Fishburn, P. C. (1977) · SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1137/0133030 · Cited by 566
Self-citationBrams, S. J. (1975) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 531
Self-citationManipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
Gibbard, A. (1977) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911681 · Cited by 443
Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice
Rae, D. W. (1969) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400261467 · Cited by 442
Holmer, F., & Black, D. (1959) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.1177/106591295901200231 · Cited by 239
The Theory of Committees and Elections
Holmer, F., & Black, D. (1959) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/444007 · Cited by 228
Manipulation of social choice functions
Gärdenfors, P. (1976) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(76)90016-8 · Cited by 227
The Number of Political Parties: A Reexamination of Duverger's Law
Riker, W. H. (1976) · Comparative Politics · doi:10.2307/421293 · Cited by 223
A Note on the Simple Majority Decision Rule
Inada, K.-I. (1964) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1910176 · Cited by 199
Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
Kelly, J. S. (1977) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911220 · Cited by 164
The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
Barberà, S. (1977) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913950 · Cited by 138
Peleg, B. (1978) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913652 · Cited by 134
Kalai, E., & Muller, E. (1977) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90019-9 · Cited by 117
An analysis of simple two-stage voting systems
Fishburn, P. C., & Gehrlein, W. V. (1976) · Systems Research and Behavioral Science · doi:10.1002/bs.3830210102 · Cited by 81
Self-citationManipulation of social decision functions
Barberà, S. (1977) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90101-6 · Cited by 74
Third Parties in Presidential Elections
Hrebenar, R. J., & Mazmanian, D. A. (1974) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/447723 · Cited by 68
On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
Bhaskar Dutta, Y., & Pattanaik, P. K. (1978) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913653 · Cited by 53
Joslyn, R. A. (1976) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf01726327 · Cited by 45
Simple voting systems and majority rule
Fishburn, P. C. (1974) · Systems Research and Behavioral Science · doi:10.1002/bs.3830190303 · Cited by 43
Self-citationAn analysis of voting procedures with nonranked voting
Fishburn, P. C., & Gehrlein, W. V. (1977) · Systems Research and Behavioral Science · doi:10.1002/bs.3830220304 · Cited by 39
Self-citationMajority rule and general decision rules
Straffin, P. D. (1977) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/bf00141532 · Cited by 39
Presidential Primaries: Measuring Popular Choice
Kellett, J., & Mott, K. F. (1977) · Polity · doi:10.2307/3234329 · Cited by 36
The Presidential Election Game
Jameson, M. (2008) · Math Horizons · doi:10.1080/10724117.2008.11974786 · Cited by 33
A Strategic Analysis of Nonranked Voting Systems
Fishburn, P. C. (1978) · SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1137/0135040 · Cited by 32
Self-citationOn Preferences, Beliefs, and Manipulation within Voting Situations
Blin, J.-M., & Satterthwaite, M. A. (1977) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912678 · Cited by 24
The calculus of rational choice
Stratmann, W. C. (1974) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf01718499 · Cited by 9
Research works printed but not linked: 13
- Keech, 1976, The Party's Choice
- Kiewiet, 1977, Approval Voting: The Case of the 1968 Presidential Election
- Fishburn, 1977, Aggregation and Revelation of Preference
- Borda, 1781, Histoire de l'Académie Royale des Sciences
- Condorcet, 1785, Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix
- Weber, 1977, Comparison of Voting Systems
- Boehm, 1976, One Fervent Vote against Wintergreen.
- Weber, 1977, Multiple-Weighted Voting Systems
- Merrill, 1978, Mathematics Magazine
- Scammon, 1970, The Real Majority: An Extraordinary Examination of the American Electorate
- Brams, 1977, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems: Mathematical Economics and Game Theory: Essays in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern, 564
- Pazner, 1978, Theory and Decision
- Brams, 1976, One Man, N Votes
Cited by
Powell, B. J., Waltz, T. J., Chinman, M. J., Damschroder, L. J., Smith, J. L., Matthieu, M. M., Proctor, E. K., & Kirchner, J. E. (2015) · Implementation Science · doi:10.1186/s13012-015-0209-1 · Cited by 4,963
“Approval voting is particularly useful for efficiently identifying the most acceptable choice [37], as it has been deemed the most “sincere and strategy proof” form of voting [38].”
BackgroundIncentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas
Carey, J. M., & Shugart, M. S. (1995) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/0261-3794(94)00035-2 · Cited by 2,663
Myerson, R. B., & Weber, R. J. (1993) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2938959 · Cited by 466
“Under the rules of approval voting, a voter can give one or zero votes independently to each of the candidates (see, e.g., Brams and Fishburn 1978,1983; Merrill 1988; Weber 1977).”
BackgroundIndependence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
Tideman, N. (1987) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/bf00433944 · Cited by 359
van der Eijk, C., van der Brug, W., Kroh, M., & Franklin, M. (2006) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2005.06.012 · Cited by 354
Metadata
- Authors
- Brams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- Pennsylvania State University (US)
- ORCID
- Brams, Steven J.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1978-09
- Volume
- 72
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 831-847
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W4253543286
- Cited by
- 446
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 33 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 25 · 2018: 28 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 6
- FWCI
- 31.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
- Keywords
- approval voting, strategy-proofness, dichotomous preferences, voter turnout, second-round election, two-party system
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.