Approval Voting
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Abstract
Approval voting is a method of voting in which voters can vote for (“approve of”) as many candidates as they wish in an election. This article analyzes properties of this method and compares it with other single-ballot nonranked voting systems. Among the theorems proved is that approval voting is the most sincere and most strategyproof of all such voting systems; in addition, it is the only system that ensures the choice of a Condorcet majority candidate if the preferences of voters are dichotomous. Its probable empirical effects would be to (1) increase voter turnout, (2) increase the likelihood of a majority winner in plurality contests and thereby both obviate the need for runoff elections and reinforce the legitimacy of first-ballot outcomes, and (3) help centrist candidates, without at the same time denying voters the opportunity to express their support for more extremist candidates. The latter effect's institutional impact may be to weaken the two-party system yet preserve middle-of-the-road public policies of which most voters approve.
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“Approval voting is particularly useful for efficiently identifying the most acceptable choice [37], as it has been deemed the most “sincere and strategy proof” form of voting [38].”
From A refined compilation of implementation strategies: results from the Expert Recommendations for Implementing Change (ERIC) project (2015) · cites this paper as [38]
Citations
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Cited by
Powell, B. J., Waltz, T. J., Chinman, M. J., Damschroder, L. J., Smith, J. L., Matthieu, M. M., Proctor, E. K., & Kirchner, J. E. (2015) · Implementation Science · doi:10.1186/s13012-015-0209-1 · Cited by 4,963
“Approval voting is particularly useful for efficiently identifying the most acceptable choice [37], as it has been deemed the most “sincere and strategy proof” form of voting [38].”
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Myerson, R. B., & Weber, R. J. (1993) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2938959 · Cited by 466
“Under the rules of approval voting, a voter can give one or zero votes independently to each of the candidates (see, e.g., Brams and Fishburn 1978,1983; Merrill 1988; Weber 1977).”
BackgroundIndependence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
Tideman, N. (1987) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/bf00433944 · Cited by 359
van der Eijk, C., van der Brug, W., Kroh, M., & Franklin, M. (2006) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2005.06.012 · Cited by 354
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Self-citationChapter 22 Social choice theory
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Approval Balloting for Multi-winner Elections
Kilgour, D. M. (2010) · Studies in choice and welfare · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_6 · Cited by 159
A minimax procedure for electing committees
Brams, S. J., Kilgour, D. M., & Sanver, M. R. (2007) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-007-9165-x · Cited by 155
“This procedure is based on approval balloting—whereby voters approve of as many candidates as they like (Brams and Fishburn, 1978, 1983)—but votes are not aggregated in the usual manner.5 Instead of selecting the candidates that receive the most votes, the minimax procedure selects the set of…”
MethodSelf-citationCollective choice under dichotomous preferences
Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H. J., & Stong, R. (2004) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.005 · Cited by 154
FAST CAPITALISM: PARA-ETHNOGRAPHY AND THE RISE OF THE SYMBOLIC ANALYST
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REFLECTIONS ON YOUTH, FROM THE PAST TO THE POSTCOLONY
Comaroff, J., & Comaroff, J. (2006) · Duke University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctv11smt25.14 · Cited by 159
Voting Procedures: A Summary Analysis
Nurmi, H. (1983) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123400003215 · Cited by 144
Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy
Lalley, S. P., & Weyl, E. G. (2018) · AEA Papers and Proceedings · doi:10.1257/pandp.20181002 · Cited by 137
Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
Brams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C. (2005) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s00355-005-0013-y · Cited by 135
“Our first article (Brams and Fishburn, 1978) was a formal analysis of the properties of AV that included, as an illustration, its application to the 1968 U.S. presidential election, in which there were three significant candidates (Richard M. Nixon, Hubert H. Humphrey, and George Wallace).”
MethodSelf-citationAxioms for approval voting: Direct proof
Fishburn, P. C. (1978) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(78)90062-5 · Cited by 127
Self-citationDhillon, A., & Mertens, J. (1999) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00033 · Cited by 123
Grofman, B., & Feld, S. L. (2003) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2003.08.001 · Cited by 109
Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference
Brams, S. J., & Sanver, M. R. (2009) · Studies in choice and welfare · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79128-7_12 · Cited by 105
Self-citationSocial Choice Observed: Five Presidential Elections of the American Psychological Association
Chamberlin, J. R., Cohen, J. L., & Coombs, C. H. (1984) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2130971 · Cited by 102
Barberà, S. (2011) · Handbook of social choice and welfare · doi:10.1016/s0169-7218(10)00025-0 · Cited by 101
The Problem of Strategic Behavior under Approval Voting
Niemi, R. G. (1984) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1955800 · Cited by 100
Plurality Versus Majority Election of Presidents: A Proposal for a “Double Complement Rule”
SHUGART, M. S., & TAAGEPERA, R. (1994) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414094027003001 · Cited by 96
Dis&approval voting: a characterization
Alcantud, J. C. R., & Laruelle, A. (2013) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s00355-013-0766-7 · Cited by 91
Between liberalism and democracy
Samet, D., & Schmeidler, D. (2003) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00080-2 · Cited by 91
“A well-known rule for such a problem is approval voting (see Brams and Fishburn [4]), in which the elected committee consists of the individuals with the highest score, where the score of an individual is the number of voters who include her in their votes.”
BackgroundVice versus virtue investing around the world
Lobe, S., & Walkshäusl, C. (2014) · Review of Managerial Science · doi:10.1007/s11846-014-0147-3 · Cited by 112
Electing Popes: Approval Balloting and Qualified-Majority Rule
Colomer, J. M., & McLean, I. (1998) · The Journal of Interdisciplinary History · doi:10.1162/002219598551616 · Cited by 87
Colomer, J. M. (2006) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2006.02.002 · Cited by 82
“…successive, ‘staggered’ single-seat elections or may require voters in a multi-seat election to choose one candidate for 1 In contrast, standard approval voting permits voting for up to all candidates but one, as presented in Brams and Fishburn (1978, 1983), Weber (1995), Colomer and McLean (1998).”
BackgroundReview of Paradoxes Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate
Felsenthal, D. S. (2011) · Studies in choice and welfare · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-20441-8_3 · Cited by 85
Erdélyi, G., Nowak, M., & Rothe, J. (2009) · Mathematical logic quarterly · doi:10.1002/malq.200810020 · Cited by 73
“As is common, the chair is assumed to have complete knowledge of the voters ’ preference rankings and approval strategies, 8 and as in most papers on electoral control we define the contro l problems in the unique5Brams and Sanver [1] define an AV strategy to be admissible if i t is not dominated in a game-theoretic s…”
BackgroundBorda Count Versus Approval Voting: A Fuzzy Approach
García-Lapresta, J. L., & Martínez-Panero, M. (2002) · Public Choice · doi:10.1023/a:1015609200117 · Cited by 72
Critical strategies under approval voting: Who gets ruled in and ruled out
Brams, S. J., & Sanver, M. R. (2005) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2005.05.007 · Cited by 71
Self-citationBaujard, A., Igersheim, H., Lebon, I., Gavrel, F., & Laslier, J. (2013) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2013.11.003 · Cited by 68
GENTRIFICATION GENERALIZED: FROM LOCAL ANOMALY TO URBAN “REGENERATION” AS GLOBAL URBAN STRATEGY
Smith, N. (2006) · Duke University Press eBooks · doi:10.1215/9780822388234-010 · Cited by 91
Applying voting theory in participatory decision support for sustainable timber harvesting
Laukkanen, S., Palander, T., & Kangas, J. (2004) · Canadian Journal of Forest Research · doi:10.1139/x04-044 · Cited by 66
VOTING ON GROWTH CONTROL MEASURES: PREFERENCES AND STRATEGIES*
Dubin, J. A., Kiewiet, D. R., & NOUSSAIR, C. N. (1992) · Economics and Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1992.tb00062.x · Cited by 66
“The electoral regime that obtained here was thus tantamount to approval voting (Brams and Fishburn 1978); voters could vote for one, both, or neither propositions, but could not rank-order them.”
BackgroundDivided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment
Bouton, L., Castanheira, M., & Llorente-Saguer, A. (2015) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.11.003 · Cited by 65
“Under sincere voting, σsA (A) = (13)An exception is Dewan and Myatt (2007) and Myatt (2007) who emphasize the existence of threecandidate equilibria when there is aggregate uncertainty.”
BackgroundShrestha, Y. R., & Yang, Y. (2019) · Algorithms · doi:10.3390/a12090199 · Cited by 55
Towards a goal‐driven approach to action selection in self‐adaptive software
Salehie, M., & Tahvildari, L. (2011) · Software Practice and Experience · doi:10.1002/spe.1066 · Cited by 60
“For cardinal preferences, Nash voting [38] can be used, and for the ordinal case, approval voting [4] is one of the options.”
MethodAn Analysis of Simple Voting Systems for Electing Committees
Fishburn, P. C. (1981) · SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1137/0141041 · Cited by 60
Self-citationGoodin, R. E., & List, C. (2006) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00225.x · Cited by 60
“…rule, we finally show that, if we enrich the informational environment and use, for example, approval balloting instead of single-vote balloting, our May-style argument for plurality rule can be turned into a May-style argument for approval voting as defined by Brams and Fishburn (1978, 1983).”
On combining approval with disapproval voting
Felsenthal, D. S. (1989) · Systems Research and Behavioral Science · doi:10.1002/bs.3830340105 · Cited by 59
Approval voting and strategy analysis: A Venetian example
Lines, M. (1986) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/bf00135090 · Cited by 58
Voting Under Uncertainty: A Stochastic Framework for Analyzing Group Decision Making Problems
Madani, K. M., Read, L., & Shalikarian, L. (2014) · Water Resources Management · doi:10.1007/s11269-014-0556-8 · Cited by 57
“4.5 Approval Vote (Brams and Fishburn 1978) Approval voting is a less restricted form of plurality rule based on which voters are allowed to vote for more than one alternative.”
InfluentialComputational Aspects of Approval Voting
Baumeister, D., Erdélyi, G., Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L. A., & Rothe, J. (2010) · Studies in choice and welfare · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_10 · Cited by 57
The Effect of Approval Balloting on Strategic Voting under Alternative Decision Rules
Merrill, S., & Nagel, J. H. (1987) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1961964 · Cited by 56
Voting systems and strategic manipulation: An experimental study
Bassi, A. (2014) · Journal of Theoretical Politics · doi:10.1177/0951629813514300 · Cited by 53
“Assuming this definition of sincerity, Brams and Fishburn (1978) argue that approval voting is subject to a milder type of strategic manipulation: voters react to strategic considerations by truncating their preference scale in a different way (setting their approval threshold higher or lower in…”
BackgroundInfluentialApproval Balloting for Fixed-Size Committees
Kilgour, D. M., & Marshall, E. (2011) · Studies in choice and welfare · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-20441-8_12 · Cited by 53
Brams, S. J., & Kilgour, D. M. (2014) · Studies in choice and welfare · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-05158-1_18 · Cited by 52
Self-citationA framework for participatory budget elaboration support
Ríos, J., & Insua, D. R. (2007) · Journal of the Operational Research Society · doi:10.1057/palgrave.jors.2602501 · Cited by 50
“Although many voting schemes are available (Brams and Fishburn, 2002), for reasons outlined in Brams and Fishburn (1978), we use approval voting over the projects to determine the winning budget.”
MethodA Simple Characterization of Approval Voting
Alós‐Ferrer, C. (2006) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s00355-006-0145-8 · Cited by 48
“This argument goes back to Brams and Fishburn (1978), who proved the nonmanipulability of AV in the domain of dichotomous preferences.”
BackgroundStatistical evaluation of voting rules
Green-Armytage, J., Tideman, N., & Cosman, R. (2015) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s00355-015-0909-0 · Cited by 46
“Two measures of efficiency are predominant here: the share of trials in which the 9 See, for example, Nitzan (1985), Smith (1999), and Aleskerov and Kurbanov (1999).”
InfluentialApproval voting: three examples
Sinopoli, F. D., Bhaskar Dutta, Y., & Laslier, J. (2006) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/s00182-006-0053-2 · Cited by 46
“Hence, the analysis will often refer to the following set: It is easy to see (cf. Brams and Fishburn, 1978) that an undominated strategy always approves the most preferred candidate(s) and does not approve the least preferred one(s).”
BackgroundThe Structure of Voter Preferences
Radcliff, B. (1993) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2131996 · Cited by 46
Rothe, J., & Schend, L. (2013) · Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1007/s10472-013-9359-5 · Cited by 45
“These very interesting results have been discussed by Erdélyi et al. (2009b), who considerbasicjunta distributions (defined just as junta distributions but disregarding symmetry and refinement, as these two properties are specific to manipulation problems) for general NP-hard problems, i.e., not…”
BackgroundOn the Justice of Decision Rules
Apesteguía, J., Ballester, M. A., & Ferrer, R. (2011) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdq023 · Cited by 44
A Pragmatic Method for Evaluating Election Schemes through Simulation
Bordley, R. F. (1983) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956015 · Cited by 44
Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: Summary and interpretation
Fishburn, P. C., & Gehrlein, W. V. (1982) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/bf00133974 · Cited by 44
Self-citationTwo field experiments on Approval Voting in Germany
Alós‐Ferrer, C., & Granic, G. D. (2011) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s00355-011-0550-5 · Cited by 43
“It is also often claimed (e.g., Brams and Fishburn 1978) that, compared to more complicated ranking methods, it is easy for voters to understand the Approval Voting method.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialOrtiz-Urbina, E., González‐Pachón, J., & Díaz-Balteiro, L. (2019) · Forests · doi:10.3390/f10050375 · Cited by 43
Complexity of manipulation, bribery, and campaign management in Bucklin and fallback voting
Faliszewski, P., Reisch, Y., Rothe, J., & Schend, L. (2014) · Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems · doi:10.1007/s10458-014-9277-x · Cited by 43
On the existence of a minimum integer representation for weighted voting systems
Freixas, J., & Molinero, X. (2008) · Annals of Operations Research · doi:10.1007/s10479-008-0422-2 · Cited by 43
“…(1995), Carreras and Freixas (1996), Taylor and Zwicker (1999); in Boolean functions, it appears in Hammer et al. (2000); in social choice, it occurs in Fishburn (1969); in the study of fair division, it occurs in Brams et al. (1979); and in voting theory, it appears in Brams and Fishburn (1976).”
BackgroundStrategic decisions under one-stage multi-candidate voting systems
Merrill, S. (1981) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00163774 · Cited by 43
Hoffman, D. T. (1982) · SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1137/0142053 · Cited by 41
Presidential Nomination Politics in the Post-Reform Era
Norrander, B. (1996) · Political Research Quarterly · doi:10.1177/106591299604900411 · Cited by 41
“Approval voting is most widely advocated by Brams (1978; Brams and Fishburn 1978; see also Kellett and Mott 1977).”
BackgroundEmpirical study on voting power in participatory forest planning
Vainikainen, N., Kangas, A. S., & Kangas, J. (2007) · Journal of Environmental Management · doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2007.02.004 · Cited by 41
Ranking and Suggesting Popular Items
Vojnović, M., Cruise, J. R., Gunawardena, D., & Marbach, P. (2009) · IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering · doi:10.1109/tkde.2009.34 · Cited by 43
“Our system can be seen as a voting system, in particular, approval voting [8, 4] where each user can select an arbitrary subset of candidates offered on a voting ballot.”
BackgroundApproval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences
Vorsatz, M. (2006) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s00355-006-0149-4 · Cited by 40
“If the recruiting committee decides by voting whom to interview, then every member of the recruiting committee classifies candidates either as “acceptable” or as “nonacceptable”, that is the members of recruiting committee have dichotomous preference on the set of candidates.”
BackgroundOn the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
Goertz, J. M. M., & Maniquet, F. (2011) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.001 · Cited by 38
“JEL classification: C72, D72, D81, D82.”
Implementability via protective equilibria
Barberà, S., & Bhaskar Dutta, Y. (1982) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(82)90005-2 · Cited by 38
“Then, for any PE 8”, fi(P) = x, where, for all y E A - {x}, fi is a member of the class of ‘approval voting’ schemes introduced by Fishburn and Brams (1978).”
BackgroundRanking languages in the European Union: Before and after Brexit
Ginsburgh, V. A., Moreno‐Ternero, J. D., & Weber, S. (2017) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.01.009 · Cited by 36
Introduction: The Anthropology of Capital and the Frontiers of Ethnography
Downey, G., & Fisher, M. S. (2006) · Duke University Press eBooks · doi:10.1215/9780822388234-001 · Cited by 37
Water Allocation Management Under Scarcity: a Bankruptcy Approach
Zheng, Y., Sang, X., Liu, Z., Zhang, S., & Liu, P. (2022) · Water Resources Management · doi:10.1007/s11269-022-03098-0 · Cited by 36
“…b g,h + b h,g = 1 (33) For each alternative j , the sum of compare point is: X The “win” alternative PC j under Pairwise comparisons rule is: Approval voting, AV , is a method of voting in which stakeholders can vote for (approve for) as many alternatives as they wish (Brams and Fishburn, 1978).”
MethodHow to Elect a Representative Committee Using Approval Balloting
Kilgour, D. M., Brams, S. J., & Sanver, M. R. (2007) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/3-540-35605-3_6 · Cited by 36
“For (Q,m), nQ,m(1) = 4, nQ,m(2) = 1, nQ,m(3) = 2, and 2 = 2, so minisum(Q,m) = {100, 101}; in other words, both 100 and 101 are minisum committees for (Q,m).”
BackgroundSelf-citationSincerity and manipulation under approval voting
Endriss, U. (2012) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/s11238-012-9301-z · Cited by 36
“On the other hand, Brams and Fishburn (1978) argue that “no voting system [including AV] is sincere”, which in particular excludes the guaranteed existence of a sincere best response.”
BackgroundResultInfluentialThe ostrogorski paradox and its relation to nontransitive choice
Bezembinder, T. G. G., & van Acker, P. (1985) · Journal of Mathematical Sociology · doi:10.1080/0022250x.1985.9989986 · Cited by 36
Models for conflict resolution in ecosystem management
Shields, D. J., Tolwinski, B., & Kent, B. (1999) · Socio-Economic Planning Sciences · doi:10.1016/s0038-0121(98)00003-2 · Cited by 35
The Burr Dilemma in Approval Voting
Nagel, J. H. (2007) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00493.x · Cited by 34
Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes
Diss, M., & Doghmi, A. (2016) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-016-0376-x · Cited by 34
Manipulability of voting by sincere truncation of preferences
Fishburn, P. C., & Brams, S. J. (1984) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00119689 · Cited by 34
Self-citationYang, J. C., Hausladen, C. I., Peters, D., Pournaras, E., Fricker, R. H., & Helbing, D. (2024) · Digital Government Research and Practice · doi:10.1145/3665332 · Cited by 50
“This is the standard approval voting [Brams and Fishburn 1978], without any constraints imposed, except that we required the selection of at least one project.”
MethodZolfagharipoor, M. A., & Ahmadi, A. (2016) · Journal of Environmental Management · doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2016.07.094 · Cited by 33
A Strategic Analysis of Nonranked Voting Systems
Fishburn, P. C. (1978) · SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1137/0135040 · Cited by 32
Self-citationDiscrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
Fishburn, P. C. (1984) · SIAM Journal on Algebraic and Discrete Methods · doi:10.1137/0605028 · Cited by 32
Self-citationApproval elections with a variable number of winners
Kilgour, D. M. (2016) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/s11238-016-9535-2 · Cited by 31
“First, we set the terminology and notation for approval voting in a single-winner election (Brams and Fishburn 1978, 1983).”
MethodAlcantud, J. C. R., Calle, R. D. A., & Barbero, J. M. C. (2013) · Information Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.ins.2013.03.061 · Cited by 30
“Since the publication of Brams and Fishburn [6, 7], many organizations and scientific societies use AV, to wit, the Mathematical Association of America (MAA), the American Mathematical Society (AMS), the Institute for Operational Research and Management Sciences (INFORMS), the American Statistical Association (ASA), t…”
BackgroundAlcalde–Unzu, J., & Vorsatz, M. (2008) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2008.08.002 · Cited by 30
“Jorge Alcalde-Unzu∗and Marc Vorsatz† March 14, 2007”
The inverse plurality rule—an axiomatization
Baharad, E., & Nitzan, S. I. (2005) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s00355-005-0048-0 · Cited by 30
“…interesting and easy to implement voting mechanism as the "inverse plurality rule".1 Although these two rules represent polar voting mechanisms, both are special cases of scoring rules that can be conceived as restricted versions of the flexible "approval voting" rule (Brams and Fishburn (1978)).”
BackgroundFishburn, P. C., & Gehrlein, W. V. (1980) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(80)90006-7 · Cited by 30
Self-citationApproval voting and Arrow’s impossibility theorem
Maniquet, F., & Mongin, P. (2014) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s00355-014-0847-2 · Cited by 29
“The technical literature sometimes defines dichotomous preferences to have exactly two non-empty indifference classes, thus excluding complete indifference (e.g., Brams and Fishburn 1978).”
BackgroundInfluentialCan we improve upon approval voting?
Yılmaz, M. (1999) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/s0176-2680(98)00043-3 · Cited by 29
Pasanen, K., Kurttila, M., Pykäläinen, J., Kangas, J., & Leskinen, P. (2005) · International Journal of Information Technology & Decision Making · doi:10.1142/s0219622005001726 · Cited by 28
Why does voting get so complicated? A review of theories for analyzing democratic participation
Gainous, J., & Gill, J. (2002) · Statistical Science · doi:10.1214/ss/1049993199 · Cited by 31
Electoral equilibrium in double member districts
Cox, G. W. (1984) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00119692 · Cited by 27
Quadratic Vote BuyingPreprint
Weyl, E. G. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2003531 · Cited by 27
How voters use grade scales in evaluative voting
Baujard, A., Gavrel, F., Igersheim, H., Laslier, J., & Lebon, I. (2017) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.09.006 · Cited by 26
Approval voting with endogenous candidates
Déllis, A., & Oak, M. P. (2005) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.010 · Cited by 25
“We state this formally in lemma 1 (due to Brams and Fishburn (1978)).”
BackgroundThe welfare consequences of strategic behaviour under approval and plurality voting
Lehtinen, A. P. (2008) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.03.002 · Cited by 25
APPROVAL VOTING IN MULTICANDIDATE ELECTIONS
Brams, S. J. (1980) · Policy Studies Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.1980.tb00928.x · Cited by 25
Self-citationWould letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
Déllis, A. (2008) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.002 · Cited by 24
“3 Approval Voting is a voting procedure that had been popularized by Brams and Fishburn [7].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Brams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- Pennsylvania State University (US)
- ORCID
- Brams, Steven J.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1978-09
- Volume
- 72
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 831-847
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W4253543286
- Cited by
- 446
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 33 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 25 · 2018: 28 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 6
- FWCI
- 31.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
- Keywords
- approval voting, strategy-proofness, dichotomous preferences, voter turnout, second-round election, two-party system
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.