The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty
Abstract
The paradox of not voting is examined in a model where voters have uncertainty about the preferences and costs of other voters. In game-theoretic models of voter participation under complete information, equilibrium outcomes can have substantial turnout even when voting costs are relatively high. In contrast, when uncertainty about preferences and costs is present, only voters with negligible or negative net voting costs participate when the electorate is large.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies since 1945
Franklin, M. N., Eijk, C. V. D., Evans, D., Fotos, M., Hirczy de Mino, W., Marsh, M., & Wessels, B. (2004) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511616884 · Cited by 1,421
Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment
GERBER, A. S., GREEN, D. P., & LARIMER, C. W. (2008) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305540808009x · Cited by 1,345
Aldrich, J. H. (1993) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111531 · Cited by 1,203
Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted?
ALFORD, J. R., FUNK, C. L., & HIBBING, J. R. (2005) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055405051579 · Cited by 987
Gentzkow, M. (2006) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.121.3.931 · Cited by 842
Metadata
- Authors
- Palfrey, T. R., & Rosenthal, H.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1985-03-01
- Volume
- 79
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 62-78
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2112490723
- Cited by
- 653
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 21.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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