The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes
Open accessAbstract
Predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters' beliefs about how parties will perform following an election. Similarly, party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards. We develop a multistage game-theoretic model of three-party competition under proportional representation. The final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature. This game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election, and the parties' electoral policy positions. At the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome. We solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes.
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Cites
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Banfield, E. C., & Downs, A. (1958) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2109186 · Cited by 18,594
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Rubinstein, A. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912531 · Cited by 5,264
The Theory of Political Coalitions
Brazil, B. R., & Riker, W. S. (1963) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/445870 · Cited by 2,106
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
Shepsle, K. A. (1979) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110770 · Cited by 1,483
The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction.
Ploeg, F. V. D., Enelow, J. M., & Hinich, J. M. (1985) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2233238 · Cited by 1,046
The Two-party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science
Riker, W. H. (1982) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400189580 · Cited by 995
Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence
Calvert, R. L. (1985) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111212 · Cited by 825
Robertson, D. B. (1976) · Cited by 708
The Effect of Electoral Rewards in Multiparty Competition with Entry
Greenberg, J., & Shepsle, K. A. (1987) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1961965 · Cited by 130
Cited by
Party Policy in Modern Democracies
Benoit, K., & Laver, M. (2006) · doi:10.4324/9780203028179 · Cited by 1,616
Adams, J., Clark, M., Ezrow, L., & Glasgow, G. (2006) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00199.x · Cited by 709
Congruence between Citizens and Policymakers in Two Visions of Liberal Democracy
Huber, J. D., & Powell, G. B. (1994) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2950684 · Cited by 680
An Informational Rationale for Political Parties
Snyder, J. M., & Ting, M. M. (2002) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/3088416 · Cited by 532
When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancingin Parliamentary Elections
KEDAR, O. (2005) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055405051592 · Cited by 389
Metadata
- Authors
- Austen-Smith, D., & Banks, J.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1988-06
- Volume
- 82
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 405-422
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W109341979
- Cited by
- 731
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 30.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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