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Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes
Open accessAbstract
Predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters' beliefs about how parties will perform following an election. Similarly, party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards. We develop a multistage game-theoretic model of three-party competition under proportional representation. The final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature. This game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election, and the parties' electoral policy positions. At the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome. We solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Austen-Smith, D., & Banks, J.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1988-06
- Volume
- 82
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 405-422
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W109341979
- Cited by
- 731
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 30.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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