The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power
Abstract
Legislative committees have fascinated scholars and reformers for more than a century. All acknowledge the central strategic position of committees in legislatures. The consensus, however, centers on empirical regularities and stylized facts, not on explanations. We seek to explain why committees are powerful. We formulate an institutionally rich rational-choice model of legislative politics in which the sequence of the legislative process is given special prominence. Committees, as agenda setters in their respective jurisdictions, are able to enforce many of their policy wishes not only because they originate bills but also because they get a second chance after their chamber has worked its will. This occurs at the conference stage in which the two chambers of a bicameral legislature resolve differences between versions of a bill. A theory of conference politics is offered and some evidence from recent Congresses is provided.
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Cites
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Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912767 · Cited by 1,692
Weingast, B. R., & Marshall, W. J. (1988) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261528 · Cited by 1,527
Self-citationWeingast, B. R., & Moran, M. J. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261181 · Cited by 1,431
Self-citationThe Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists
Axelrod, R. (1981) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1961366 · Cited by 956
1888: ‘The American Commonwealth’
Ions, E. (1968) · James Bryce and American Democracy 1870–1922 · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-00649-6_11 · Cited by 856
Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics
Wilson, W. (2017) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315080628 · Cited by 311
Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior
Denzau, A. T., & Mackay, R. J. (1983) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110891 · Cited by 269
Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style
Denzau, A., Riker, W., & Shepsle, K. (1985) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956251 · Cited by 194
Self-citationWhen Do Rules of Procedure Matter?
Shepsle, K. A., & Weingast, B. R. V. (1984) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2130440 · Cited by 151
Self-citationThe politics of private desires
Laver, M. (1981) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 82
Standing Committees in Legislatures: Three Decades of Research
Eulau, H. H. F., & Mccluggage, V. (1984) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/439393 · Cited by 18
Cited by
Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games
Putnam, R. D. (1988) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300027697 · Cited by 7,475
POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONALISM: Explaining Durability and Change
Clemens, E. S., & Cook, J. M. (1999) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.25.1.441 · Cited by 1,411
Crawford, S. E. S., & Ostrom, E. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082975 · Cited by 1,362
Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
HALL, R. L., & DEARDORFF, A. V. (2006) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055406062010 · Cited by 1,172
Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives
Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511791123 · Cited by 1,134
Metadata
- Authors
- Shepsle, K. A., & Weingast, B. R.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1987-03
- Volume
- 81
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 85-104
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W4253759198
- Cited by
- 823
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 89.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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