The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bargaining in Legislatures
Abstract
Bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided. Legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature. Although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria, it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures. In our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts, explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting. The model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard, institution-free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium.
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Citations
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Cited by
Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work
Giné, V. L., & Tsebelis, G. (2003) · Reis · doi:10.2307/40184562 · Cited by 3,359
The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1998) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081898550699 · Cited by 2,521
Party Policy in Modern Democracies
Benoit, K., & Laver, M. (2006) · doi:10.4324/9780203028179 · Cited by 1,616
What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge
Ruggie, J. G. (1998) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081898550770 · Cited by 1,402
Separation of Powers and Political Accountability
Persson, T., Roland, G., & Tabellini, G. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555457 · Cited by 1,171
Metadata
- Authors
- Baron, D. P., & Ferejohn, J. A.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1989-12-01
- Volume
- 83
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1181-1206
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2316473956
- Cited by
- 1,970
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 25.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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