The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice
Abstract
We contrast the rational theory of choice in the form of expected utility theory with descriptive psychological analysis in the form of prospect theory, using problems involving the choice between political candidates and public referendum issues. The results showed that the assumptions underlying the classical theory of risky choice are systematically violated in the manner predicted by prospect theory. In particular, our respondents exhibited risk aversion in the domain of gains, risk seeking in the domain of losses, and a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains. This is consistent with the advantage of the incumbent under normal conditions and the potential advantage of the challenger in bad times. The results further show how a shift in the reference point could lead to reversals of preferences in the evaluation of political and economic options, contrary to the assumption of invariance. Finally, we contrast the normative and descriptive analyses of uncertainty in choice and address the rationality of voting.
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Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Self-citationJudgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1975) · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1834-0_8 · Cited by 22,650
Self-citationJudgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
(1982) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477 · Cited by 8,240
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.39.4.341 · Cited by 6,544
Self-citation
Cited by
International Norm Dynamics and Political Change
Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081898550789 · Cited by 8,292
Status quo bias in decision making
Samuelson, W., & Zeckhauser, R. (1988) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00055564 · Cited by 5,897
Inferences of competence from faces predict election outcomes
Todorov, A., Mandisodza, A. N., Goren, A., & Hall, C. C. (2005) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1110589 · Cited by 1,508
The Influence of Framing on Risky Decisions: A Meta-analysis
Kühberger, A. (1998) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1006/obhd.1998.2781 · Cited by 1,121
Heath, C., Larrick, R. P., & Wu, G. (1999) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1006/cogp.1998.0708 · Cited by 1,009
Metadata
- Authors
- Quattrone, G. A., & Tversky, A.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1988-09
- Volume
- 82
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 719-736
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2054359618
- Cited by
- 877
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 4.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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