The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness
Abstract
Even when political interests control bureaucratic outputs, the control of policy outcomes is complicated by trade-offs between controllable versus effective implementation strategies. I use a nested game framework to explain why a cooperative strategy can increase enforcement effectiveness in the narrow administrative game and why principal-agent control problems and collective action problems associated with the strategy lead policy beneficiaries to oppose the effective strategy in the broader political games. Analyses of state-level Occupational Safety and Health Administration enforcement provide evidence that cooperation does enhance the impact of enforcement in reducing workplace injury rates but that policy beneficiaries oppose and sabotage cooperation. The interactions between administrative effectiveness and interest group politics in this and other implementation situations require that both be analyzed simultaneously, and the nested game framework can provide a systematic approach to such analyses.
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Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
Connolly, T., & Axelrod, R. (1984) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2392957 · Cited by 3,890
Downs, A. (1967) · doi:10.7249/cb156 · Cited by 1,983
The New Economics of Organization
Moe, T. M. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110997 · Cited by 1,974
Weingast, B. R., & Moran, M. J. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261181 · Cited by 1,431
Nested games: rational choice in comparative politics
(1990) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.28-0532 · Cited by 1,336
Implementation and Public Policy
Goggin, M. L., Mazmanian, D. A., & Sabatier, P. A. (1984) · CrossRef Listing of Deleted DOIs · doi:10.2307/3330197 · Cited by 1,269
Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory
Rasmusen, E. (2006) · Cited by 1,189
Games and information: An introduction to game theory
Leiniger, W. (1991) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-7187(91)90026-h · Cited by 837
Going by the Book, the Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness
Wolman, M. G., Bardach, E., & Kagan, R. A. (1983) · Journal of Policy Analysis and Management · doi:10.2307/3324493 · Cited by 835
Cited by
THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELS
Miller, G. J. (2005) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104840 · Cited by 865
Regulation Inside Government: Waste-Watchers, Quality Police, and Sleazebusters
Hood, C., James, O., Jones, G., Scott, C., & Travers, T. (1999) · doi:10.1093/0198280998.001.0001 · Cited by 654
Green Clubs and Voluntary Governance: ISO 14001 and Firms' Regulatory Compliance
Potoski, M., & Prakash, A. (2005) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2005.00120.x · Cited by 649
Murphy, K., Tyler, T. R., & Curtis, A. (2009) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/j.1748-5991.2009.01043.x · Cited by 313
(2016) · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Scholz, J. T.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1991-03
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 115-136
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2104269187
- Cited by
- 296
- References
- 48
- FWCI
- 22.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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