The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness
Abstract
Even when political interests control bureaucratic outputs, the control of policy outcomes is complicated by trade-offs between controllable versus effective implementation strategies. I use a nested game framework to explain why a cooperative strategy can increase enforcement effectiveness in the narrow administrative game and why principal-agent control problems and collective action problems associated with the strategy lead policy beneficiaries to oppose the effective strategy in the broader political games. Analyses of state-level Occupational Safety and Health Administration enforcement provide evidence that cooperation does enhance the impact of enforcement in reducing workplace injury rates but that policy beneficiaries oppose and sabotage cooperation. The interactions between administrative effectiveness and interest group politics in this and other implementation situations require that both be analyzed simultaneously, and the nested game framework can provide a systematic approach to such analyses.
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Self-citation
Cited by
THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELS
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Metadata
- Authors
- Scholz, J. T.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1991-03
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 115-136
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2104269187
- Cited by
- 296
- References
- 48
- FWCI
- 22.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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