The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems
Abstract
A theory of government formation in parliamentary systems is developed from a model incorporating policy-oriented parties with spatial preferences and a formation process in which parties are selected in sequence to attempt to form a government. A government is formed when the policy proposed by the party selected is sustained on a vote of confidence. The equilibria identify the government and the policy it will implement and depend on the configuration of preferences and on the government formation process. For example, in a political system with two large parties and one small party and in which one of the two large parties will be selected to attempt to form a government, the government will be formed by a large party with the support of the small party. The policy will reflect the preferences of the small party but will be closer to the ideal point of the large party.
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Cites
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Stuart, A., & Black, D. (1959) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2550498 · Cited by 2,822
The Theory of Political Coalitions
Brazil, B. R., & Riker, W. S. (1963) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/445870 · Cited by 2,106
Baron, D. P., & Ferejohn, J. A. (1989) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1961664 · Cited by 1,970
Self-citationThe Theory of Political Coalitions.
Hotz, A. J., & Riker, W. H. (1963) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2109034 · Cited by 1,528
Multiparty government: The politics of coalition in Europe
(1991) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/0261-3794(91)90033-o · Cited by 966
Minority government and majority rule
DeLue, S. M. (1991) · History of European Ideas · doi:10.1016/0191-6599(91)90164-t · Cited by 918
(1987) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511558771 · Cited by 901
Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes
Austen-Smith, D., & Banks, J. (1988) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1957393 · Cited by 731
Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction
Ordeshook, P. C. (1986) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511666742 · Cited by 717
Party Policy and Government Coalitions
(1992) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-22368-8 · Cited by 604
Cited by
International Norm Dynamics and Political Change
Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081898550789 · Cited by 8,292
The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1998) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081898550699 · Cited by 2,521
Party Policy in Modern Democracies
Benoit, K., & Laver, M. (2006) · doi:10.4324/9780203028179 · Cited by 1,616
What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge
Ruggie, J. G. (1998) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081898550770 · Cited by 1,402
Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data
LAVER, M., BENOIT, K., & GARRY, J. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000698 · Cited by 1,377
Metadata
- Authors
- Baron, D. P.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1991-03
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 137-164
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2110133257
- Cited by
- 266
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 14.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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