The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy
Abstract
A new paradigm of political-bureaucratic relations emerged through the 1980s holding that U.S. democratic institutions continuously shape nonelective public bureaucracies. Several empirical studies support the paradigm with evidence suggestive of political manipulation but none reveals the scope or specific mechanisms of political control. We explore the dynamics of political control of the bureaucracy explicitly to determine the scope and mechanisms. We examine output time series from seven different public bureaucracies for responsiveness to political tools applied in the late Carter and early Reagan administrations. We find responsiveness in all seven cases. The evidence also shows that political appointments—a shared power of the president and Congress—is the most important instrument of political control; changing budgets, legislation, congressional signals, and administrative reorganizations are less important. These findings confirm intuitive assertions by institutional scholars and suggest a method of “policy monitoring” that could enhance future democratic control of the bureaucracy.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A new look at the statistical model identification
Akaike, H. (1974) · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · doi:10.1109/tac.1974.1100705 · Cited by 51,879
Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control
Geurts, M., Box, G. E. P., & Jenkins, G. M. (1977) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.2307/3150485 · Cited by 19,186
(1963) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 15,085
(1979) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 11,252
Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control
Kleiner, B. (1977) · Technometrics · doi:10.1080/00401706.1977.10489562 · Cited by 6,446
Quasi-experimentation: Design and analysis issues for field settings
Shrout, P. E. (1980) · Evaluation and Program Planning · doi:10.1016/0149-7189(80)90063-4 · Cited by 6,010
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms
McCubbins, M. D., & Schwartz, T. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110792 · Cited by 2,936
Intervention Analysis with Applications to Economic and Environmental Problems
Box, G. E. P., & Tiao, G. C. (1975) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1975.10480264 · Cited by 2,383
The New Economics of Organization
Moe, T. M. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110997 · Cited by 1,974
The Politics of the Budgetary Process
Groves, H. M., & Wildavsky, A. (1965) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1055574 · Cited by 1,638
Cited by
The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance for Europe
Sabatier, P. A. (1998) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/13501768880000051 · Cited by 1,462
Majone, G. (1997) · Journal of Public Policy · doi:10.1017/s0143814x00003524 · Cited by 1,358
The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU
Pollack, M. A. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199251177.001.0001 · Cited by 888
Van Slyke, D. M. (2006) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/mul012 · Cited by 885
Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?
Waterman, R. W., & Meier, K. J. (1998) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024377 · Cited by 713
Self-citationEvaluating the Advocacy Coalition Framework
Jenkins-Smith, H. C., & Sabatier, P. A. (1994) · Journal of Public Policy · doi:10.1017/s0143814x00007431 · Cited by 474
Sowa, J. E., & Selden, S. C. (2003) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/1540-6210.00333 · Cited by 421
Groups, the Media, Agency Waiting Costs, and FDA Drug Approval
Carpenter, D. P. (2002) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/3088394 · Cited by 333
The European Commission and the integration of Europe: images of governance
(2002) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.40-1174 · Cited by 329
Monitoring and enforcement of environmental policy
Cohen, M. A. (1999) · The International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics 1999/2000 · doi:10.4337/9781035365913.00009 · Cited by 300
Barley, S. R. (2010) · Organization Studies · doi:10.1177/0170840610372572 · Cited by 295
Predicting Public Sector Accountability: From Agency Drift to Forum Drift
Schillemans, T., & Busuioc, M. (2015) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muu024 · Cited by 290
Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy
Balla, S. J. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585488 · Cited by 281
Political Control versus Bureaucratic Values: Reframing the Debate
Meier, K. J., & O'Toole, L. J. (2006) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00571.x · Cited by 277
Advocacy-Koalitionen, Policy-Wandel und Policy-Lernen: Eine Alternative zur Phasenheuristik
Sabatier, P. A. (1993) · Policy-Analyse · doi:10.1007/978-3-663-01473-7_6 · Cited by 275
Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability
Quintyn, M. (2003) · CESifo Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/cesifo/49.2.259 · Cited by 216
Chen, Y., Bretschneider, S., Stritch, J. M., Darnall, N., & Hsueh, L. (2022) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719037.2021.1874497 · Cited by 66
Metadata
- Authors
- Wood, B. D., & Waterman, R. W.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1991-09
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 801-828
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2148426523
- Cited by
- 750
- References
- 37
- FWCI
- 64.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.