The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy
Abstract
A new paradigm of political-bureaucratic relations emerged through the 1980s holding that U.S. democratic institutions continuously shape nonelective public bureaucracies. Several empirical studies support the paradigm with evidence suggestive of political manipulation but none reveals the scope or specific mechanisms of political control. We explore the dynamics of political control of the bureaucracy explicitly to determine the scope and mechanisms. We examine output time series from seven different public bureaucracies for responsiveness to political tools applied in the late Carter and early Reagan administrations. We find responsiveness in all seven cases. The evidence also shows that political appointments—a shared power of the president and Congress—is the most important instrument of political control; changing budgets, legislation, congressional signals, and administrative reorganizations are less important. These findings confirm intuitive assertions by institutional scholars and suggest a method of “policy monitoring” that could enhance future democratic control of the bureaucracy.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A new look at the statistical model identification
Akaike, H. (1974) · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · doi:10.1109/tac.1974.1100705 · Cited by 51,879
Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control
Geurts, M., Box, G. E. P., & Jenkins, G. M. (1977) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.2307/3150485 · Cited by 19,186
(1963) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 15,085
(1979) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 11,252
Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control
Kleiner, B. (1977) · Technometrics · doi:10.1080/00401706.1977.10489562 · Cited by 6,446
Quasi-experimentation: Design and analysis issues for field settings
Shrout, P. E. (1980) · Evaluation and Program Planning · doi:10.1016/0149-7189(80)90063-4 · Cited by 6,010
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms
McCubbins, M. D., & Schwartz, T. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110792 · Cited by 2,936
Intervention Analysis with Applications to Economic and Environmental Problems
Box, G. E. P., & Tiao, G. C. (1975) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1975.10480264 · Cited by 2,383
The New Economics of Organization
Moe, T. M. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110997 · Cited by 1,974
The Politics of the Budgetary Process
Groves, H. M., & Wildavsky, A. (1965) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1055574 · Cited by 1,638
The Political Economy of Federalism
Chubb, J. E. (1985) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956245 · Cited by 1,444
Weingast, B. R., & Moran, M. J. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261181 · Cited by 1,431
Wilson, J. Q. (2021) · The Political Economy · doi:10.4324/9781315495811-9 · Cited by 1,084
The Politics of the Budgetary Process
de Grove, J. M., & Wildavsky, A. (1965) · The Yale Law Journal · doi:10.2307/794677 · Cited by 619
A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion
Calvert, R. L., McCubbins, M. D., & Weingast, B. R. V. (1989) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111064 · Cited by 600
Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB
Moe, T. M. (1985) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956250 · Cited by 544
Nathan, R. P. (1983) · Cited by 487
Private Power and American Democracy, by Grant McConnell
Kesselman, M. (1967) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2147249 · Cited by 480
Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements
Wood, B. D. (1988) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1958066 · Cited by 423
Self-citationInformation Criteria for Discriminating Among Alternative Regression Models
Sawa, T. (1978) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913828 · Cited by 391
The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure
McCubbins, M. D. (1985) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111178 · Cited by 388
The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress.
Jones, C. O., Fenno, R. F., & Pressman, J. L. (1967) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2108620 · Cited by 341
Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System
Scholz, J. T., & Wei, F. H. (1986) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400185090 · Cited by 277
Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration
Moe, T. M. (1982) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111036 · Cited by 271
Congress and the administrative state
Dodd, L. C., & Schott, R. L. (1979) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 231
The Decline and Resurgence of Congress
Bozeman, B., & Sundquist, J. L. (1982) · Journal of Policy Analysis and Management · doi:10.2307/3324397 · Cited by 182
Kofmehl, K. (1982) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400187350 · Cited by 177
Presidential Control versus Bureaucratic Power: Explaining the Reagan Revolution in Antitrust
Eisner, M. A., & Meier, K. J. (1990) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111519 · Cited by 159
Does Politics Make a Difference at the EEOC?
Wood, B. D. (1990) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111459 · Cited by 142
Self-citationCongress Oversees the Bureaucracy
Ogul, M. S. (1976) · University of Pittsburgh Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/jj.12612582 · Cited by 124
The Political Process: Executive Bureau-Legislative Committee Relations
Crotty, W. J., & Freeman, J. L. (1966) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/445490 · Cited by 123
Davidson, R. (1988) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1962570 · Cited by 91
Environmental Policy in the 1980s: Reagan's New Agenda
Holland, L., Vig, N. J., & Kraft, M. E. (1984) · Journal of Policy Analysis and Management · doi:10.2307/3324569 · Cited by 90
Regulation: The Politics of Policy
Reagan, M. D. (1987) · Cited by 82
Principal-Agent Models of Political Control of Bureaucracy
Cook, B. J., & Wood, B. D. (1989) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1962069 · Cited by 81
Self-citationStacking the Deck: Bureaucratic Missions and Policy Design
Bendor, J., Taylor, S., & Gaalen, R. V. (1987) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1962681 · Cited by 78
Cited by
The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance for Europe
Sabatier, P. A. (1998) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/13501768880000051 · Cited by 1,462
Majone, G. (1997) · Journal of Public Policy · doi:10.1017/s0143814x00003524 · Cited by 1,358
The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU
Pollack, M. A. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199251177.001.0001 · Cited by 888
Van Slyke, D. M. (2006) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/mul012 · Cited by 885
Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?
Waterman, R. W., & Meier, K. J. (1998) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024377 · Cited by 713
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Wood, B. D., & Waterman, R. W.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1991-09
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 801-828
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2148426523
- Cited by
- 750
- References
- 37
- FWCI
- 64.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.