The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Campaign Contributions and Access
Abstract
An important and pervasive view of campaign contributions is that they are given to promote access to successful candidates under circumstances when such access would not ordinarily be given. In this story, access is valuable as it offers groups the opportunity to influence legislative decisions through the provision of policy-relevant information. Under complete information regarding donors' policy preferences, I argue that this model predicts a negative relationship between contributions and the extent to which the groups' and the recipient legislators' preferences are similar. However, one of the more robust empirical findings in the literature is that this relationship is positive. Relaxing the informational assumption on donors' preferences, I reexamine the access story with a model in which campaign contributions can act as signals of policy preference and the (informational) value of access to any agent is endogenous.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citation(2017) · West Virginia Politics and Government, Second Edition · doi:10.2307/j.ctt1dfntx8.8 · Cited by 409
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Self-citationAsymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous
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Lobbying and asymmetric information
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Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
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Self-citationMoney and Access: Some Empirical Evidence
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Cited by
The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1998) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081898550699 · Cited by 2,521
What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge
Ruggie, J. G. (1998) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081898550770 · Cited by 1,402
Corporate lobbying in the European Union: the logic of access
Bouwen, P. (2002) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/13501760210138796 · Cited by 724
Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process
Bertrand, M., Bombardini, M., & Trebbi, F. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.12.3885 · Cited by 483
Morris, S. (2001) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/319554 · Cited by 420
Metadata
- Authors
- Austen-Smith, D.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1995-09
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 566-581
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2169157059
- Cited by
- 450
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 20.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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