The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence
Abstract
In this paper, I analyze how legislators structure their interactions with lobbyists so as to limit undue interest group influence. A simple game theoretic model is developed to show that legislators have various means by which to control lobbying activity, even in the absence of stringent lobbying regulations. The costliness of the lobbyist's signals limit the lobbyist's ability to exaggerate claims.
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Cites
Olson, M. (1965) · doi:10.4159/9780674041660 · Cited by 14,191
Cited by
Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress
Hojnacki, M., & Kimball, D. C. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2586303 · Cited by 353
Interest Group Influence in the U. S. Congress
Smith, R. A. (1995) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/440151 · Cited by 284
Interest Group Success in the European Union: When (and Why) Does Business Lose?
Dür, A., Bernhagen, P., & Marshall, D. (2015) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414014565890 · Cited by 264
Leech, B. L. (2010) · The Oxford Handbook of American Political Parties and Interest Groups · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199542628.003.0028 · Cited by 91
Metadata
- Authors
- Ainsworth, S.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1993-02
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 41-56
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W2147330432
- Cited by
- 226
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 22.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Ainsworth, S. (1993). Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence. The Journal of Politics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2132227
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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