The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Chains of Cooperation: Threshold Effects in Collective Action
Abstract
Granovetter's threshold model of collective action shows how each new participant triggers others until the chain reaction reaches a gap in the distribution of thresholds. Hence outcomes depend on the network of social ties that channel the chain reactions. However, structural analysis is encumbered by the assumption that thresholds derive from changing marginal returns on investments in public goods. A learning-theoretic specification imposes less stringent assumptions about the rationality of the actors and is much better suited to a structural analysis. Computer simulations suggest that threshold effects may be the key to solving the coordination problem: When individual choices are contingent on participation by others, this interdependence facilitates the coordination of contributions needed to shift the bistable system from a noncooperative equilibrium to a cooperative one. Further simulations with low-density networks show that these chain reactions require bridges that link socially distant actors, supporting Granovetter's case for the strength of weak ties.
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Manifesto for a Relational Sociology
Emirbayer, M. (1997) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/231209 · Cited by 3,791
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Centola, D., & Macy, M. (2007) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/521848 · Cited by 1,878
Self-citationSocial dilemmas: the anatomy of cooperation
Kollock, P. (1998) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.183 · Cited by 1,746
From Factors to Actors: Computational Sociology and Agent-Based Modeling
Macy, M. W., & Willer, R. (2002) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.28.110601.141117 · Cited by 1,443
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Macy, M. W.
- Venue
- American Sociological Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1991-12
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 730
- ISSN
- 0003-1224 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2079434400
- Cited by
- 490
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 11.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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