The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions
Abstract
This paper investigates the nature of multicandidate electoral equilibria under three different classes of single-ballot-single-winner voting systems: (1) scoring rules (including the plurality rule, Borda's method of marks, and negative voting); (2) Condorcet completion procedures; and (3) multiple vote procedures (including approval voting). Some of the key findings of the paper are that (1) multicandidate equilibria under the plurality rule must be noncentrist (Theorem 1); (2) in an election held under any Condorcet procedure, candidates have a dominant strategy to adopt the median voter's position (Theorem 4); (3) there is a set of nontrivial voting methods for which equilibria routinely exist regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space; and (4) the plurality rule is alone among commonly discussed voting procedures in not having centrist multicandidate equilibria.
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Tsebelis, G. (1995) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123400007225 · Cited by 2,605
Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market
Norris, P. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511615955 · Cited by 813
Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems
Myerson, R. B. (1993) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2938819 · Cited by 472
Myerson, R. B., & Weber, R. J. (1993) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2938959 · Cited by 466
DOWNS AND TWO-PARTY CONVERGENCE
Grofman, B. (2004) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104711 · Cited by 385
POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY
Stokes, S. C. (1999) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.243 · Cited by 347
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cox, G. W.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1987-02
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 82
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1993550267
- Cited by
- 339
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 9.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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