The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems
Open accessAbstract
A simple model is used to compare, under different electoral systems, the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters, by making campaign promises that favor small groups, rather than appealing equally to all voters. In this game model, each candidate generates offers for voters independently out of a distribution that is chosen by the candidate, subject only to the constraints that offers must be nonnegative and have mean 1. Symmetric equilibria with sincere voting are analyzed for two-candidate elections and for multicandidate elections under rank-scoring rules, approval voting, and single transferable vote. Voting rules that can guarantee representation for minorities in multiseat elections generate, in this model, the most severely unequal campaign promises.
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Cites
The Two-party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science
Riker, W. H. (1982) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400189580 · Cited by 995
Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems
Cox, G. W. (1990) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111465 · Cited by 869
Myerson, R. B., & Weber, R. J. (1993) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2938959 · Cited by 466
Self-citationElectoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions
Cox, G. W. (1987) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111325 · Cited by 339
Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Myerson, R. B. (1993) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1993.1006 · Cited by 291
Self-citationStructure and Behaviour: Extending Duverger's Law to the Japanese Case
Reed, S. R. (1990) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123400005871 · Cited by 197
Cited by
Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas
Carey, J. M., & Shugart, M. S. (1995) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/0261-3794(94)00035-2 · Cited by 2,663
The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics
Dixit, A., & Londregan, J. (1996) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2960152 · Cited by 1,506
Electoral engineering: voting rules and political behavior
(2004) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.42-1232 · Cited by 845
The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization
Treisman, D. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511619151 · Cited by 800
Lizzeri, A., & Persico, N. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/0033553041382175 · Cited by 757
Metadata
- Authors
- Myerson, R. B.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1993-12
- Volume
- 87
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 856-869
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W1993470021
- Cited by
- 472
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 8.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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