The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature
Abstract
This paper combines an organization theory perspective with rational choice techniques to study legislative design. The specific focus is on how a legislature assigns members and transfers resources to standing committees with the aim of motivating committees to specialize and to share the benefits of specialization. The stimulus for the study comes from organization theory and a long tradition of empirical congressional studies. The main analytical tool, however, is a game of incomplete information. Several testable propositions about legislative organization are derived.
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Cites
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gilligan, T. W., & Krehbiel, K.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1990-05
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 531
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2030197407
- Cited by
- 395
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 15.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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