The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rational Choice and Turnout
Abstract
Turning out to vote is the most common and important act of political participation in any democracy. Voting is also less well understood and explained empirically than other political acts engaged in regularly by citizens. Turnout, however, presents a special problem for rational choice theories of politics, for it is taken to be the paradigmatic example of the problem of collective action, in which, although all may benefit from voting, it is rarely in the individual's self-interest to vote. This paper begins by examining the problem of explaining turnout. A basic form of rational choice models of turnout is developed-basic in the sense that it is common to all such models. This basic model is shown to be incomplete, and the two most important models, the calculus of voting and the minimax regret model, are illustrated as alternative ways to complete this basic model, along with mention of game-theoretic models. Their strengths and weaknesses are then assessed. The remainder of the paper argues that rational choice accounts of turnout are possible. The first step is to argue that turnout is not an especially problematic version of the collective action problem because it is, for many, a low cost, low (expected) benefit decision. A strategic politicians account of turnout and campaigns is examined next. A reinterpretation of the intrinsic benefits of voting is then considered and is used to examine the most important substantive problem in the turnout literature, its decline. These steps, I argue, make theories of ordinary political decisions at once both more political and more integrated into the politics of the larger system.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Aldrich, J. H.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993-02
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 246
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2037668165
- Cited by
- 1,203
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 61.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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