The DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress
Abstract
In a departure from previous research, we focus on the dyadic relationship between lobbyists and committee members in the House of Representatives in order to test hypotheses about what factors shape the decisions of individual groups to lobby individual committee members. Our primary assumption is that organized interests seek to expand their supportive coalitions and affect the content and fate of bills referred to committees. In order to accomplish these goals, they give highest priority to lobbying their legislative allies in committee; allies may lobby other members of Congress on a group's behalf and shape legislation to conform with a group's preferences. But organizations with access to a strong resource base can move beyond their allies and work directly to expand support among undecided committee members and legislative opponents. Our empirical analysis provides evidence to support our expectations.
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Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees
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Kingdon, J. (1989) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.7354 · Cited by 724
Cited by
Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
HALL, R. L., & DEARDORFF, A. V. (2006) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055406062010 · Cited by 1,172
Setting the agenda: responsible party government in the U.S. House of Representatives
(2006) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-4315 · Cited by 910
Blanes i Vidal, J., Draca, M., & Fons-Rosen, C. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.3731 · Cited by 639
Richter, B. K., Samphantharak, K., & Timmons, J. F. (2009) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00407.x · Cited by 406
Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying
de Figueiredo, J. M., & Richter, B. K. (2014) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-100711-135308 · Cited by 367
Metadata
- Authors
- Hojnacki, M., & Kimball, D. C.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1998-12
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 775-790
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2329423875
- Cited by
- 353
- References
- 45
- FWCI
- 8.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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