The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Econometrics of First-Price Auctions
Abstract
Egalement paru dans : Document de travail ; 91-09 WP, INRA-ESR Toulouse
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity
White, H. (1980) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912934 · Cited by 25,861
Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators
Hansen, L. P. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912775 · Cited by 13,467
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-Nested Hypotheses
Vuong, Q. H. (1989) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912557 · Cited by 5,929
Self-citationHammersley, J. M., & Handscomb, D. C. (1964) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-5819-7 · Cited by 4,054
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911865 · Cited by 3,753
Simulation and the Monte Carlo Method
Rubinstein, R. Y., & Kroese, D. P. (2016) · Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics · doi:10.1002/9781118631980 · Cited by 3,356
McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1986) · Scholarship@Western (Western University) · Cited by 2,240
McFadden, D. (1989) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913621 · Cited by 1,637
Simulation and the Asymptotics of Optimization Estimators
Pakes, A., & Pollard, D. (1989) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913622 · Cited by 1,494
Cited by
Putting Auction Theory to Work
Milgrom, P. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511813825 · Cited by 1,642
Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
Klemperer, P. (1999) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00083 · Cited by 1,394
Simulation-based Econometric Methods
Gouriéroux, C., & Monfort, A. (1997) · doi:10.1093/0198774753.001.0001 · Cited by 1,038
Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets
Chiappori, P., & Salanie, B. (2000) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262111 · Cited by 1,013
Gallant, A. R., & Tauchen, G. (1996) · Econometric Theory · doi:10.1017/s0266466600006976 · Cited by 988
Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
Guerre, E., Perrigne, I., & Vuong, Q. (2000) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00123 · Cited by 710
Self-citationMicro Data, Heterogeneity, and the Evaluation of Public Policy: Nobel Lecture
Heckman, J. J. (2001) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/322086 · Cited by 675
Athey, S. (2001) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00223 · Cited by 567
Simple estimators for the parameters of discrete dynamic games (with entry/exit examples)
Pakes, A., Ostrovsky, M., & Berry, S. (2007) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00073.x · Cited by 482
Wolfram, C. D. (1998) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2556090 · Cited by 399
Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions
Bajari, P., & Hortacsu, A. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.224950 · Cited by 372
User Heterogeneity and its Impact on Electronic Auction Market Design: An Empirical Exploration1
Bapna, R., Goes, P., Gupta, A., & Jin, Y. (2004) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/25148623 · Cited by 333
Hortaçsu, A., & McAdams, D. (2010) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/657948 · Cited by 296
The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After
Laffont, J.-J. (1994) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951658 · Cited by 285
Self-citationDoes E-Procurement Save the State Money?
Singer, M., Konstantinidis, G., Roubik, E., & Beffermann, E. (2009) · Journal of Public Procurement · doi:10.1108/jopp-09-01-2009-b002 · Cited by 61
Metadata
- Authors
- Laffont, J.-J., Ossard, H., & Vuong, Q.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1995-07
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 953
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2036996477
- Cited by
- 352
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 21.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.