The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard
Abstract
The authors study collective choice of fiscal policy in 'federations.' Local policy redistributes across individuals and affects the probability of local shocks. Federal policy shares international risk but may induce local governments to enact policies that increase local risk. The resulting trade-off between risk-sharing and moral hazard is different under alternative fiscal constitutions because the constitutions create different incentives for policymakers and voters and give rise to different political equilibria. The authors specifically contrast vertically ordered systems, like the European Community, with horizontally ordered systems, like the United States. Under appropriate institutions, centralization of functions and power can mitigate the moral hazard problem. Copyright 1996 by The Econometric Society.
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Cites
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Rogoff, K. (1985) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885679 · Cited by 3,688
Wilson, R. (1968) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1909607 · Cited by 1,149
The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
Rogerson, W. P. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913212 · Cited by 868
THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT
TIROLE, J. (1994) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a042114 · Cited by 685
Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
Jewitt, I. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911363 · Cited by 511
The Economics of Uncertainty and Information.
Loomes, G., & Laffont, J.-J. (1992) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2555080 · Cited by 365
Casella, A., & Frey, B. (1992) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(92)90122-d · Cited by 186
The redistributive roles of unemployment insurance and the dynamics of voting
Wright, R. (1986) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(86)90066-6 · Cited by 150
Cited by
Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions
Filippov, M., Ordeshook, P. C., & Shvetsova, O. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610875 · Cited by 366
Incentives and Political Economy
Laffont, J.-J. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199248680.001.0001 · Cited by 299
Political Economics and Public Finance
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (1999) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7097 · Cited by 279
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Persson, T., & Tabellini, G.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1996-05
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 623
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2089349505
- Cited by
- 373
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 73.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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