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Skepticism about Weakness of Will
Abstract
A Though it occurs with deplorable frequency, weakness of will has seemed to many philosophers hard to understand. The motivation of weak behavior' is generally familiar and intelligible enough: the desire to remain in bed, or the desire for another drink are ordinary examples. Nevertheless, our common ways of describing and explaining this phenomenon have been thought to involve serious difficulties. These descriptions and explanations can, upon reflection, seem incoherent. Accordingly, weakness of will has given rise to various forms of skepticism. The most notorious form is socratism, which denies the possibility of such behavior. Another form of skepticism admits its possibility but casts doubt upon a complex of distinctions and moral attitudes involved in the common view. Briefly, it argues that no one who acts contrary to his or her better judgment does so freely, that weakness of will cannot be significantly distinguished from psychological compulsion', and that therefore certain moral distinctions implicit in the common view cannot be justified. My concern in this paper will be to explore and develop a version of nonsocratic skepticism. In my view, socratism is incorrect, but like Socrates, I think that the common understanding of weakness of will raises serious problems. Contrary to soc-
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Citations
Cited by
Kane, R. (1999) · doi:10.1093/0195126564.001.0001 · Cited by 1,316
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Clarke, R. (2003) · doi:10.1093/019515987x.001.0001 · Cited by 474
Intention and Weakness of Will
Holton, R. (1999) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2564667 · Cited by 368
Goodin, R. E. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199256179.001.0001 · Cited by 340
Plato's Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics
Bobonich, C. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0199251436.001.0001 · Cited by 308
Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion
Smith, M. (2003) · Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality · doi:10.1093/0199257361.003.0002 · Cited by 303
Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality
(2003) · doi:10.1093/0199257361.001.0001 · Cited by 285
Art and Intention: A Philosophical Study
Livingston, P. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199278067.001.0001 · Cited by 276
Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason
Tenenbaum, S. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498855 · Cited by 260
Akrasia, Collective and Individual
Pettit, P. (2003) · Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality · doi:10.1093/0199257361.003.0004 · Cited by 32
Collaborative Irrationality, Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation
Szanto, T. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.02002 · Cited by 12
“…be best to do; nor do we necessarily have to accept the view that emotions can be so powerful as to directly change the behavior of an agent at the very instance of the respective action, or to refer to ‘irresistible desires’—a notion that some have rightly rejected (Watson, 1977; Elster, 2010).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Watson, G.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1977-07
- Volume
- 86
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 316
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2157726074
- Cited by
- 386
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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