Personal Identity
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In the citing paper
“The nomenclature is somewhat misleading: no one denies that, for Thomas, the separated soul (whose incorruptibility is knowable by reason) survives throughout the intermediate period from death until bodily resurrection.”
From How to believe in immortality (2024) · cites this paper as [9]
In the citing paper
“The survivalist reading, however, interprets Thomas as allowing for the idea that human personhood persists throughout the intermediate period.”
From How to believe in immortality (2024) · cites this paper as [9]
In the citing paper
“But the corruptionist reading is that the human person does not survive the loss of the body at death.”
From How to believe in immortality (2024) · cites this paper as [9]
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Items 401–500 of 795
IDENTIDAD PERSONAL Y SUJETO ÉTICO DOS MODELOS ALTERNATIVOS A DEREK PARFIT
Partal, M. B. (2020) · SCIO Revista de Filosofía · doi:10.46583/scio_2020.18.699 · Cited by 1
Les choix moraux du psychopathe sous le prisme de la théorie de l’identité morale
Garcia, M. (2021) · L Évolution Psychiatrique · doi:10.1016/j.evopsy.2021.01.005 · Cited by 1
The introduction of the problem of personal identity in the university course of philosophy
Оліфер, О. Є. (2021) · SHS Web of Conferences · doi:10.1051/shsconf/202110402005 · Cited by 1
McMahan, J. (2002) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195079981.003.0005 · Cited by 1
Cochrane, T. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108579056.006 · Cited by 1
Velleman, J. D. (2015) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0061.08 · Cited by 1
McMahan, J. (2002) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195079981.003.0001 · Cited by 1
Olson, E. T. (1999) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195134230.003.0005 · Cited by 1
Relativism and Two Kinds of Branching Time
Ninan, D. (2022) · Pacific philosophical quarterly · doi:10.1111/papq.12418 · Cited by 1
Truth, Marks of Truth, and Conditionals
Rumfitt, I. (2022) · Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0031819121000437 · Cited by 1
Neuroscientific and Cognitive Perspectives on the Zhuangzi
Raphals, L. A. (2022) · Dao companions to Chinese philosophy · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-92331-0_29 · Cited by 1
THE MANY WORRIES OF MANY WORLDS
Qureshi‐Hurst, E. (2023) · Zygon® · doi:10.1111/zygo.12868 · Cited by 2
Anti-Criterialism Does Not Result in an Unacceptable Consequence
Zhan, X. (2024) · Metaphysica · doi:10.1515/mp-2023-0046 · Cited by 1
4.5 Die Stufen der moralischen Orientierung
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-024 · Cited by 1
4.3 Der funktionalistische Ansatz: Moralischen Kompetenz als Komponenten-Modell
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-022 · Cited by 1
4.4 Dual-Aspekt-Dual-Ebenen Modell
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-023 · Cited by 1
4.1 Moralische Kompetenz in Robotern: Wie ist der Stand der Forschung?
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-020 · Cited by 1
Affectivity in its Relation to Personal Identity
Zaborowski, R. (2024) · Human Studies · doi:10.1007/s10746-024-09724-7 · Cited by 1
A Contemporary Integrative Interpersonal Theory Formulation of Self and Social Pathology
Wright, A. G. C., & Nielsen, S. R. (2025) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009445955.007 · Cited by 2
Wu, Y., Watson, J., & Faraji‐Rad, A. (2025) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1177/00222437251358160 · Cited by 1
A dilemma for the soul theory of personal identity
Berger, J. (2016) · International Journal for Philosophy of Religion · doi:10.1007/s11153-016-9594-x · Cited by 1
Transitivity of visual sameness
Skrzypulec, B. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1858-9 · Cited by 1
Boonin, D. (2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610172.003 · Cited by 1
Survival of Bodily Death: a Question of Values
Martin, R. (1992) · Religious Studies · doi:10.1017/s0034412500021521 · Cited by 1
Rationality and future desires
Fuchs, A. E. (1985) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048408512342081 · Cited by 1
Lyon, A. (1980) · Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0031819100048981 · Cited by 1
Henry Holland on the hypothesis of duality of mind
Harris, L. J. (1983) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00018173 · Cited by 1
D erek P arfit's Contributions to Philosophy
Rabinowicz, W. (2016) · Theoria · doi:10.1111/theo.12088 · Cited by 1
Parfit, D. (1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.003.0008 · Cited by 1
Self-citationTheories That Are Indirectly Self‐Defeating
Parfit, D. (1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.003.0001 · Cited by 1
Self-citationFrom Subjectivity to Objectivity
Hundert, E. M. (1990) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248965.003.0002 · Cited by 1
Embodiment and the Ethical Concept of a Person
Reichold, A. (2007) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9780230206434_7 · Cited by 1
Investor Psychology and Sustainable FinancePreprint
Mahmoud, O. (2019) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3344786 · Cited by 1
Future Self-Continuity and Health Behavior
Brotkin, S. M. (2015) · Carolina Digital Repository (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) · doi:10.17615/mnyv-mt35 · Cited by 3
Cochrane, T. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108579056.011 · Cited by 1
Searle, J. R. (2017) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781405164597.ch15 · Cited by 1
Olson, E. T. (1999) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195134230.003.0008 · Cited by 1
Parfit, D. (1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.003.0002 · Cited by 1
Self-citationCommentary: Physical time within human time
Balashov, Y. V. (2023) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1084495 · Cited by 1
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-031 · Cited by 1
Ratner, K. (2020) · eCommons (Cornell University) · doi:10.7298/0e8m-ma35 · Cited by 3
Boonin, D. (2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610172.002
References (to the First Edition)
Williamson, T. L. (2013) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781118503591.refs
Les Deux ldentités de La Personne Humaine
Longeart, M. (1981) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00455091.1981.10716290
Stoljar, D. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195306589.003.0004
Boonin, D. (2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610172.007
Baker on the Psychological Account of Personal Identity
BUFORD, C. T. (2009) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-009-0056-2
Impersonal Identity and Corrupting Concepts
Behrendt, K. (2005) · The Southern Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2005.tb01949.x
Mental duality, unity and multiplicity, and a holographic model of the mind
Bradshaw, J. L. (1983) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00018161
Reply to Gold and Olin: Antidepressants and the Identity of Persons
Durà‐Vilà, G., & Durà-Vilà, V. (2010) · Transcultural Psychiatry · doi:10.1177/1363461510364879
Sprog og identitet: En oversigt
Widell, P. (2015) · Scandinavian Studies in Language · doi:10.7146/sss.v6i3.20645
ON PUCCETTI'S TWO‐PERSONS VIEW OF MAN
Cheng, C. L. Y. (1978) · The Southern Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1978.tb00210.x
Stoljar, D. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195306589.003.0008
ASMENS TAPATUMAS BE ASMENS IR BE TAPATUMO
Žalgirytė, J. (2014) · Problemos · doi:10.15388/problemos.2014.0.4925
Stoljar, D. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195306589.003.0001
Genuine Rivals, Revelation, and Concluding Remarks
Stoljar, D. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195306589.003.0011
Stoljar, D. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195306589.003.0009
Stoljar, D. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195306589.003.0010
Stoljar, D. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195306589.003.0002
Boonin, D. (2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610172.001
Boonin, D. (2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610172.005
Insubstantial Survival : Persons and Lives
Dyrhaug, E. (2011) · NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives
What Should Careproviders Do When a Patient “Won’t Budge”?
Howe, E. G. (2014) · The Journal of Clinical Ethics · doi:10.1086/jce201425301
Parfit, D. (1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.003.0018
Self-citationParfit, D. (1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.003.0007
Self-citationOlson, E. T. (1999) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195134230.003.0006
Identity and Continuity of Experience
Lewis, H. D. (1982) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-05516-6_6
Literary Reception: Structured and Unstructured Selves
Gill, C. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198152682.003.0007
Hundert, E. M. (1990) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248965.003.0012
Psychological Holism and Socratic Ideals
Gill, C. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198152682.003.0002
Hundert, E. M. (1990) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248965.003.0008
Competing Readings of Platonic Psychology
Gill, C. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198152682.003.0005
The Best Objection to the Self‐Interest Theory
Parfit, D. (1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.003.0006
Self-citationPersonal Identity and Morality
Parfit, D. (1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.003.0015
Self-citationHundert, E. M. (1990) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248965.003.0007
Hundert, E. M. (1990) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248965.003.0010
How We Are not What We Believe
Parfit, D. (1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.003.0011
Self-citationAn Afterword on Dimensionality: Kant, Space, and Geometry
Hundert, E. M. (1990) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248965.003.0005
An Afterword on Psychiatry: Implications for Therapy
Hundert, E. M. (1990) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248965.003.0009
Issues in Selfhood: Subjectivity and Objectivity
Gill, C. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198152682.003.0006
An Afterword on Kant's Synthetic a priori: Biology and the ‘World Knot’
Hundert, E. M. (1990) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248965.003.0013
Hundert, E. M. (1990) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248965.003.0014
Parfit, D. (1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.003.0009
Self-citationParfit, D. (1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.003.0019
Self-citationHick, J. H. (1985) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-18017-2_20
Hundert, E. M. (1990) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248965.003.0004
Holtug, N. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580170.003.0010
Development and the Structured Self
Gill, C. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198152682.003.0003
Parfit, D. (1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.003.0013
Self-citationHundert, E. M. (1990) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248965.003.0003
Kim, H. Y., 한상훈, & Shin, Y. (2011) · 한국심리학회지: 인지 및 생물 · doi:10.22172/cogbio.2011.23.4.003
On the economics and the psychology of intertemporal choices
Yin, R. (2018) · theses.fr (ABES) · doi:10.70675/11edd239ze6eaz4841z857fzea2cd43c6eff
A Metaphilosophical Retrospect: Grounding
Jaskolla, L. J. (2017) · Philosophical studies series · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-65927-5_6
Personal Identity and Patient-Centered Medical Decision Making
White, L. (2017) · AJOB Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/21507740.2017.1366590
A REALIDADE SOCIAL: UMA ONTOLOGIA DE SEGUNDA NATUREZA
Coitinho, D. (2018) · Pensando - Revista de Filosofia · doi:10.26694/pensando.v9i17.6990
Buonomo, V. (2019) · Archivio Istituzionale della Ricerca (Universita Degli Studi Di Milano) · doi:10.13130/buonomo-valerio_phd2019-01-09 · Cited by 1
A questão do si mesmo em Paul Ricoeur: duas tradições filosóficas
Silva, J. P. (2018) · Cognitio-Estudos: revista eletrônica de filosofia · doi:10.23925/1809-8428.2018v15i2p176-194
Against Analytic Existence Entailments
van Inwagen, P. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316612897.009 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Parfit, D.
- Corresponding author
- Parfit, Derek
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1971-01
- Volume
- 80
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4252461681
- Cited by
- 766
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 54 · 2025: 60 · 2024: 60 · 2023: 31 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 26 · 2020: 45 · 2019: 55 · 2018: 20 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 34 · 2015: 29 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 17 · 2012: 9
- FWCI
- 0.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Philosophical Review (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- personal identity, personal identity problem, persistence
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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.