Personal Identity
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“The nomenclature is somewhat misleading: no one denies that, for Thomas, the separated soul (whose incorruptibility is knowable by reason) survives throughout the intermediate period from death until bodily resurrection.”
From How to believe in immortality (2024) · cites this paper as [9]
In the citing paper
“The survivalist reading, however, interprets Thomas as allowing for the idea that human personhood persists throughout the intermediate period.”
From How to believe in immortality (2024) · cites this paper as [9]
In the citing paper
“But the corruptionist reading is that the human person does not survive the loss of the body at death.”
From How to believe in immortality (2024) · cites this paper as [9]
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Items 601–700 of 795
(1990) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248965.002.0005
Appendix: Cognitive and Moral Intersubjectivity
(1990) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248965.005.0001
(1990) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248965.002.0009
(1990) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248965.002.0003
(1990) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248965.002.0004
Rationality and the Different Theories About Self‐Interest
(1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.005.0003
(1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.002.0001
How My Weaker Conclusion Would in Practice Defeat S
(1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.005.0002
(1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.005.0010
(1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.001.0001.002.003
(2002) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195079981.001.0001.002.005
(2002) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195079981.001.0001.002.004
Whether Causing Someone to Exist Can Benefit This Person
(1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.005.0007
Parfit, D. (1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.005.0001
Self-citationParfit, D. (1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.005.0004
Self-citation(2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195306589.002.0001
(2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195306589.001.0001.002.004
(1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.005.0006
(1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.005.0005
(1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.001.0001.002.004
(2002) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195079981.002.0001
Parfit, D. (1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.005.0008
Self-citationTime-slice epistemology for Bayesians
Cassell, L. (2022) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2022.2105943
Identity: this time it's personal
Kearns, S. (2022) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2022.2092907
Ethics of Mind Uploading: Personal Identity
Gankhuu, B. (2022) · doi:10.46569/20.500.12680/5m60qz836
A Theory of LibertyPreprint
Bagnall, G. (2022) · doi:10.33774/coe-2022-r3b96
Truth and Satisfaction: Frege Versus Tarski
Frápolli, M. J. (2023) · Synthese Library/Synthese library · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-25229-7_9
Coseru, C. (2023) · Sophia studies in cross-cultural philosophy of traditions and cultures · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-13995-6_3
Herausforderungen in der aktuellen Philosophie des Selbstbewusstseins – Die Heidelberger Schule
Kreuch, G. (2023) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-25097-2_2
You could be immaterial (or not)
Bailey, A. M. (2023) · Religious Studies · doi:10.1017/s0034412523000719
Temkin, L. S., & Goodrich, J. (2019) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee910
What Matters in Survival: Self-Determination and the Continuity of Life Trajectories
Savage, H. (2023) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-023-00567-y
Prolonging Human Lifespan by Consciousness Integration or Brain IntegrationPreprint
Xie, Y. (2023) · Preprints.org · doi:10.20944/preprints202309.2114.v1
van der Heijden, C. A. A. (2023) · doi:10.5463/thesis.426
Identity Formation, Persistence and Change
Farah, R. (2023) · SpringerBriefs in law · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-44475-3_5
Suicide: The Final A.I. FrontierPreprint
Sher, S. V. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4629552
Quartet of Selves: Quinn’s Personal Identity
López, S. (2012) · English Studies in Latin America A Journal of Cultural and Literary Criticism · doi:10.7764/esla.61725
“Unresting Death, a Whole Day Nearer Now”: Parfit and Patočka on Death and False Consolations
Forsberg, N. (2023) · Contributions to phenomenology · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-49548-9_12
Оліфер, О. Є. (2023) · Actual Problems of Mind · doi:10.31812/apm.7682
Personal Persistence and Post-Mortem Survival
Baber, H. E. (2024) · TheoLogica An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology · doi:10.14428/thl.v8i2.82213
Verbalismus, Epistemizismus und die Debatte um personale Identität
Knoll, V. (2023) · Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung · doi:10.3196/004433023838087520
Genay, A. (2022) · theses.fr (ABES) · doi:10.70675/a8ae82b7z2dc0z404cza9efz066e3e240527 · Cited by 1
6.2 Mein Freund, der Roboter – eine Unterrichtseinheit für die Grundschule
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-030
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-033
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-005
2.3 »Kognitive Wende« in der Psychologie«
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-011
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-028
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-027
2.5 Linds Zwei-Aspekt-Theorie: Moral ist lehrbar
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-013
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-toc
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-019
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-026
Moralische Roboter: Humanistisch-philosophische Grundlagen und didaktische Anwendungen
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-029
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-017
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-016
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-010
2.6 Warum brauchen Roboter moralische Kompetenz?
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-014
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-032
3.4 Altruistische und empathische Maschinen
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-018
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-002
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-003
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-025
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-004
3.1 Welche Ethik ist die Richtige?
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-015
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-007
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-021
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-fm
1.5 Können Roboter Personen sein?
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-008
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-009
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-001
1.3 Roboter versus KI: Was ist der Unterschied?
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-006
2.4 Die »Renaissance des Gefühls«
Schmiljun, A., & Schmiljun, I. M. (2024) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839467206-012
Baber, H. E. (2024) · Theoria · doi:10.1111/theo.12535
Beaming Bodies: A Neo-Lockean Account of Material Persistence
Hanley, R. M. (2024) · Philosophies · doi:10.3390/philosophies9040109
Rozproszony system człowiek-artefakt jako autonomiczny sprawca. Racje i wątpliwości
Trybulec, B. (2024) · Studia Philosophiae Christianae · doi:10.21697/spch.2024.60.a.02
Bloor, G. E. (2024) · Process Studies · doi:10.5406/21543682.53.2.01
Whitnall, H. (2024) · Open Access Victoria University of Wellington | Te Herenga Waka (Figshare) · doi:10.26686/wgtn.28012265
Digital Doppelgängers: They Will Matter When Conscious
Lazaridis, C. (2025) · The American Journal of Bioethics · doi:10.1080/15265161.2024.2441741
Paleczny, P. (2025) · Open Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.4236/ojpp.2025.151008 · Cited by 1
Dependence and Fictional Characters
Chakravarty, S. (2025) · Analytic Philosophy · doi:10.1111/phib.12369
Xian, H. (2025) · Ethical Theory and Moral Practice · doi:10.1007/s10677-025-10484-1
Thomasson, A. L. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197787830.002.0005
The Explanatory Conception of Metaphysics
Thomasson, A. L. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197787830.003.0003
The Structural Conception of Metaphysics
Thomasson, A. L. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197787830.003.0004
The Traditional Conception of Metaphysics
Thomasson, A. L. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197787830.003.0002
The Truthmaker Conception of Metaphysics
Thomasson, A. L. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197787830.003.0005
Reverse Engineering: Unraveling Metaphysical Problems
Thomasson, A. L. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197787830.003.0010
The Perennial Philosophical Project
Thomasson, A. L. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197787830.003.0012
Identifying Linguistic Functions
Thomasson, A. L. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197787830.003.0009
Pragmatic Conceptual Engineering
Thomasson, A. L. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197787830.003.0011
Fundamentality and Grounding Projects
Thomasson, A. L. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197787830.003.0006
Metaphysics as Conceptual Engineering
Thomasson, A. L. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197787830.003.0008
The Grey Box of Responsibility
Knight, C. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198945703.003.0004
Knight, C. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198945703.003.0001
Knight, C. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198945703.002.0005
Objections to All-Luck Egalitarianism
Knight, C. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198945703.003.0011
The No Fault or Choice Principle
Knight, C. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198945703.003.0008
Knight, C. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198945703.003.0005
Metadata
- Authors
- Parfit, D.
- Corresponding author
- Parfit, Derek
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1971-01
- Volume
- 80
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4252461681
- Cited by
- 766
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 54 · 2025: 60 · 2024: 60 · 2023: 31 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 26 · 2020: 45 · 2019: 55 · 2018: 20 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 34 · 2015: 29 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 17 · 2012: 9
- FWCI
- 0.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Philosophical Review (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- personal identity, personal identity problem, persistence
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