Personal Identity
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In the citing paper
“The nomenclature is somewhat misleading: no one denies that, for Thomas, the separated soul (whose incorruptibility is knowable by reason) survives throughout the intermediate period from death until bodily resurrection.”
From How to believe in immortality (2024) · cites this paper as [9]
In the citing paper
“The survivalist reading, however, interprets Thomas as allowing for the idea that human personhood persists throughout the intermediate period.”
From How to believe in immortality (2024) · cites this paper as [9]
In the citing paper
“But the corruptionist reading is that the human person does not survive the loss of the body at death.”
From How to believe in immortality (2024) · cites this paper as [9]
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Kowalczyk, K. (2020) · Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) · doi:10.5287/ora-jvap45w1r · Cited by 1
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Xie, Y. (2023) · Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) · doi:10.5281/zenodo.8368923
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Velleman, D. J. (2020) · OAPEN (The OAPEN Foundation)
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Mooney, J. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198981749.003.0005
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Metadata
- Authors
- Parfit, D.
- Corresponding author
- Parfit, Derek
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1971-01
- Volume
- 80
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4252461681
- Cited by
- 766
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 54 · 2025: 60 · 2024: 60 · 2023: 31 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 26 · 2020: 45 · 2019: 55 · 2018: 20 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 34 · 2015: 29 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 17 · 2012: 9
- FWCI
- 0.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Philosophical Review (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- personal identity, personal identity problem, persistence
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.