Personal Identity
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“The nomenclature is somewhat misleading: no one denies that, for Thomas, the separated soul (whose incorruptibility is knowable by reason) survives throughout the intermediate period from death until bodily resurrection.”
From How to believe in immortality (2024) · cites this paper as [9]
In the citing paper
“The survivalist reading, however, interprets Thomas as allowing for the idea that human personhood persists throughout the intermediate period.”
From How to believe in immortality (2024) · cites this paper as [9]
In the citing paper
“But the corruptionist reading is that the human person does not survive the loss of the body at death.”
From How to believe in immortality (2024) · cites this paper as [9]
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Items 501–600 of 795
Compound Natural Beings: Varieties of Compositional Unity
Rosenkrantz, G. S. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316612897.007
Basic Objects As Grounds: A Metaphysical Manifesto
Brewer, B. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316612897.004
Introduction: Issues and Options
Cumpa, J., & Brewer, B. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316612897.001
Pragmatism, Ontology and Ordinary Objects
Baker, L. R. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316612897.011
Blouin‐Hudon, E. C. (2015) · Carleton University's Institutional Repository (MacOdrum Library, Carleton University) · doi:10.22215/etd/2015-11035 · Cited by 1
Personhood, Persistence, and Constitution
Casey, D. (2017) · Carleton University's Institutional Repository (MacOdrum Library, Carleton University) · doi:10.22215/etd/2017-12016
Дерек Парфит: забота ни о ком, как о себе самом
Нехаев, А. В. (2018) · CyberLeninK (CyberLeninka)
"Let Us Make 'adam": An Edenic Model of Personal Ontology
Nedelcu, M. S. (2019) · Digital Commons - Andrews University (Andrews University) · doi:10.32597/dissertations/1687
Challenges in Current Philosophy of Self-Consciousness – The Heidelberg School
Kreuch, G. (2019) · Contributions to phenomenology · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-30789-9_2
Richard Wollheim, The Thread of Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press1984. Pp.xv + 288.
Brook, J. A. (1987) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00455091.1987.10715925
Diverse Personalities, Egos, Roles, and Relations: Toward Workplace Wellbeing
Malakyan, P. G., Schlak, T., & Wang, W. (2020) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-02470-3_14-1
A Sperm and Ovum Separately! Contra Marquis on Abortion and Contraception
Burkhardt, T. (2020) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqaa016
Metaphysical aspects of diachronic personal identity
Sekatskaya, M. A. (2020) · Philosophy Journal · doi:10.21146/2072-0726-2020-13-2-158-172
Four-dimensional theories of persistence through time
Faul, B. V. (2020) · Philosophy Journal · doi:10.21146/2072-0726-2020-13-2-185-199
Asay, J. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108759465.006
Construal Level, Future Self-Continuity Impact on Health Decisions
洪, 超. (2019) · Advances in Psychology · doi:10.12677/ap.2019.95114
Английское философское Дерби: Джон Локк versus Дерек Парфит
Нехаев, А. В. (2019) · Omsk Scientific Bulletin Series Society History Modernity
Continuity with Future Selves in Delinquent, Financial, and Health-Related Decision Making
Quinten, L. K. J. L. (2020) · bonndoc (University of Bonn)
Life as a Trust Game: a comment on The Option Value of Life
Ponthière, G. (2021) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267121000055
Implications of Neurotechnology: Brain Recording and Intervention
Haselager, P. (2021) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108623056.017
Asay, J. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108759465.002
Truthmaking, Accounting, and Explanation
Asay, J. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108759465.003
ESSENCIALISMO MEREOLÓGICO, CORPOS E PESSOAS
Santos, P. (2021) · Kriterion Revista de Filosofia · doi:10.1590/0100-512x2021n14802ps
Byer, S. (2021) · Comparative Philosophy An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy · doi:10.31979/2151-6014(2021).120204
Spencer-Scarr, D. (2021) · Advances in business information systems and analytics book series · doi:10.4018/978-1-7998-4799-1.ch004
Löckenhoff, C. E. (2021) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-22009-9_111
Should dementia sufferers be punished for past crimes?
Jeffares, A. (2014) · Open Access Victoria University of Wellington | Te Herenga Waka (Figshare) · doi:10.26686/wgtn.17009867.v1
What is the I that I am? An Enquiry into the Self
Gosnell, J. L. (2013) · Open Access Victoria University of Wellington | Te Herenga Waka (Figshare) · doi:10.26686/wgtn.17006602
Carraud, V. (2010) · Chaire Étienne Gilson · doi:10.3917/puf.carr.2010.01.0279
(2013) · ENS Éditions eBooks · doi:10.4000/books.enseditions.4531
Asay, J. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108759465.016
Cochrane, T. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108579056.012
Truthmaker Maximalism and the Scope of Truthmaking
Asay, J. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108759465.005
Cochrane, T. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108579056.004
Cochrane, T. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108579056.005
Cochrane, T. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108579056.008
Asay, J. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108759465.013
Introduction: A Manifesto for Truthmaking
Asay, J. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108759465.001
Boonin, D. (2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610172.004
Cochrane, T. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108579056.003
Asay, J. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108759465.010
Asay, J. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108759465.009
Asay, J. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108759465.004
Cochrane, T. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108579056.001
(1991) · Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement · doi:10.1017/s135824610000758x
Asay, J. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108759465.008
Cumpa, J., & Brewer, B. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316612897.014
(2020) · Emerald Group Publishing Limited eBooks · doi:10.1108/s2055-537720200000014018
Asay, J. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108759465.011
Asay, J. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108759465.012
Cochrane, T. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108579056.002
Bakhurst, D. (2011) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781444395600.refs
Cochrane, T. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108579056.009
Conclusion: Building an Ontology
Asay, J. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108759465.014
Cochrane, T. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108579056.007
Velleman, J. D. (2015) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0061.09
Macdonald, C. (2005) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9780470775684.biblio
Holtug, N. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580170.003.0004
Holtug, N. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580170.003.0003
Olson, E. T. (1999) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195134230.003.0003
Theories That Are Directly Self‐Defeating
Parfit, D. (1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.003.0004
Self-citationMcMahan, J. (2002) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195079981.003.0002
Hundert, E. M. (1990) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248965.003.0001
McMahan, J. (2002) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195079981.003.0004
Cumpa, J., & Brewer, B. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316612897.015
Introduction: The Slugs and the Tiles
Stoljar, D. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195306589.003.intro
Holtug, N. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580170.003.0001
Holtug, N. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580170.003.0009
Temkin, L. S., & Goodrich, J. (2021) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee910.pub2
Asay, J. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108759465.007
Stoljar, D. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195306589.003.0007
Cochrane, T. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108579056.010
Löckenhoff, C. E. (2019) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-69892-2_111-1
Kim, N. S. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316691311.004
Stoljar, D. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195306589.003.0006
Asay, J. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108759465.015
The Extension of Personal Identity and Personhood
Godfrey, T. (2019) · Carleton University's Institutional Repository (MacOdrum Library, Carleton University) · doi:10.22215/etd/2019-13642
Cochrane, T. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108579056.013
Personal Identity and Rationality
Parfit, D. (1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.003.0014
Self-citationHoltug, N. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580170.003.0002
(2018) · Advances in human and social aspects of technology book series · doi:10.4018/978-1-5225-5572-8.ch002
Stoljar, D. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195306589.003.0005
Parfit, D. (1986) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.003.0005
Self-citationHoltug, N. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580170.003.0006
Olson, E. T. (1999) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195134230.003.0001
Filozofie informácie a problém jej chápania ako filozofie prima
Sadloň, D. (2022) · Pro-Fil · doi:10.5817/pf22-1-20948
Forbes, G. A., & Wildman, N. (2022) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03770-3 · Cited by 2
Diamantis, M. (2022) · Bloomsbury Academic eBooks · doi:10.5040/9781350246928.0019
(2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198152682.001.0001.002.003
(2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198152682.001.0001.002.005
(2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198152682.001.0001.002.004
(2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198152682.001.0001.002.007
(2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198152682.001.0001.002.008
(1999) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195134230.001.0001.002.005
(1999) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195134230.001.0001.002.004
(2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580170.002.0003
(1990) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248965.002.0007
Metadata
- Authors
- Parfit, D.
- Corresponding author
- Parfit, Derek
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1971-01
- Volume
- 80
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4252461681
- Cited by
- 766
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 54 · 2025: 60 · 2024: 60 · 2023: 31 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 26 · 2020: 45 · 2019: 55 · 2018: 20 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 34 · 2015: 29 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 17 · 2012: 9
- FWCI
- 0.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Philosophical Review (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- personal identity, personal identity problem, persistence
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