Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 287

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action

Kornblith, Hilary · 1983 · The Philosophical Review

Abstract

ne of the central projects of epistemological theorizing is the task of discovering the rules of ideal reasoning, both deductive and nondeductive. Another project involves appraising the beliefs of particular agents, or of particular communities. One obvious way to carry out this second project, assuming that the first has been completed, is to compare the manner which the subject under study arrived at the belief question with the rules of ideal reasoning. If the inferences made by the subject are licensed by the rules, then the belief is justified; if they are not, the belief is unjustified. Here we take a God's-eye view and hold our subject up to the highest standard of good reasoning. Setting our standards this high is often precisely what we wish to do. It is often useful and interesting to see the extent to which a subject's patterns of reasoning differ from the ideal. In this kind of evaluation, we remove our subject from his historical context and compare his reasoning with that of an ideal subject, out of time, whose reasoning is uninfluenced by the fads and fashions of a community, and informed only by objectively right principles of reason. By appraising subjects' beliefs this way, we are able to see the extent to which individuals or communities progress toward the ideal. This is not, of course, the only standard by which one might reasonably appraise a subject's beliefs. Many subjects will, of course, fall short of the ideal. More importantly, subjects will often fall short of the ideal through no fault of their own. Rules of ideal reasoning are not easily come by, and it does not always show some shortcoming on the part of the subject that his reasoning was less than ideal. Sometimes we wish to know whether a subject was reasoning as best he could, where this does not simply mean in accord with rules of ideal reasoning; we want to know whether the extent to which the subject departed from the ideal was his own fault.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.2307/2184520

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cited by

See all 287

Metadata

Authors
Kornblith, H.
Venue
The Philosophical Review
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1983-01
Volume
92
Issue
1
Pages
33
ISSN
0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2323221024
Cited by
287
References
0
FWCI
3.58
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2184520
The paper
Kornblith, H. (1983). Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action. The Philosophical Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/2184520

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.