The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action
Abstract
ne of the central projects of epistemological theorizing is the task of discovering the rules of ideal reasoning, both deductive and nondeductive. Another project involves appraising the beliefs of particular agents, or of particular communities. One obvious way to carry out this second project, assuming that the first has been completed, is to compare the manner which the subject under study arrived at the belief question with the rules of ideal reasoning. If the inferences made by the subject are licensed by the rules, then the belief is justified; if they are not, the belief is unjustified. Here we take a God's-eye view and hold our subject up to the highest standard of good reasoning. Setting our standards this high is often precisely what we wish to do. It is often useful and interesting to see the extent to which a subject's patterns of reasoning differ from the ideal. In this kind of evaluation, we remove our subject from his historical context and compare his reasoning with that of an ideal subject, out of time, whose reasoning is uninfluenced by the fads and fashions of a community, and informed only by objectively right principles of reason. By appraising subjects' beliefs this way, we are able to see the extent to which individuals or communities progress toward the ideal. This is not, of course, the only standard by which one might reasonably appraise a subject's beliefs. Many subjects will, of course, fall short of the ideal. More importantly, subjects will often fall short of the ideal through no fault of their own. Rules of ideal reasoning are not easily come by, and it does not always show some shortcoming on the part of the subject that his reasoning was less than ideal. Sometimes we wish to know whether a subject was reasoning as best he could, where this does not simply mean in accord with rules of ideal reasoning; we want to know whether the extent to which the subject departed from the ideal was his own fault.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Knowledge and its Place in Nature
Kornblith, H. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0199246319.001.0001 · Cited by 931
Self-citationHighlights of Recent Epistemology
Pryor, J. (2001) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/52.1.95 · Cited by 335
The Epistemic Role of Consciousness
Smithies, D. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199917662.001.0001 · Cited by 271
Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology
Goldman, A. I. (1993) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.2307/1522948 · Cited by 170
JUSTIFIED BELIEF IN A DIGITAL AGE: ON THE EPISTEMIC IMPLICATIONS OF SECRET INTERNET TECHNOLOGIES
Miller, B., & Record, I. (2013) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2013.11 · Cited by 153
Metadata
- Authors
- Kornblith, H.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1983-01
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 33
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2323221024
- Cited by
- 287
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 3.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2184520
- The paper
- Kornblith, H. (1983). Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action. The Philosophical Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/2184520
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.